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Abstract
Using data on the behavior of large settlement banks in the UK and the Sterling Money
Markets before and during the sub-prime crisis of 2007-08, we provide evidence of precau-
tionary hoarding of liquidity and its effect on inter-bank borrowing rates. Our evidence
consists of three pieces. First, we document that liquidity holdings of the large settlement
banks in the UK experienced on average a 30% increase in the period immediately following
9th August, 2007, the widely accepted date of money-market “freeze” during the sub-prime
crisis. Second, we show that following this structural break, bank liquidity had a precaution-
ary nature in that it rose on calendar days predicted to have a large amount of fluctuations
in payment and settlements activity and more so for banks that made larger losses during
the crisis. Third, using the payment and settlements activity as an instrument, we establish
a causal effect of bank liquidity on overnight inter-bank rates, in both secured and unse-
cured markets, an effect that is virtually absent in the period before the crisis. Importantly,
precautionary hoardings by some settlement banks raised lending rates for all settlement
banks, suggestive of a contagion-style systemic risk operating through inter-bank rates. Fi-
nally, variability in overnight inter-bank rates appears to have affected rates and volumes in
household as well as corporate lending.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted the important role played by money markets
(in other words, inter-bank markets) in shuffling liquidity around the banking system. Globally,
these markets experienced severe stress starting with the 9th of August, 2007. On this date, BNP
Paribas suspended withdrawals from some of its hedge funds invested in sub-prime mortgage-
backed securities due to the inability to mark these assets to market. The result was a freeze
in the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), which caused rollover problems for
structured investment vehicles (SIV’s) and conduits set up by banks as off-balance sheet vehicles
for liquidity and regulatory arbitrage purposes. As the ABCP liquidity dried up, banks took
assets from SIV’s and conduits back on their balance sheets.1 The resulting uncertainty – about
the extent of such assets that banks would have to take back on balance sheets, the magnitude
of losses banks faced, and whether they had enough capital to bear these losses – affected not
just capital markets but also the inter-bank market for borrowing and lending.
Inter-bank markets are generally the private lender-of-last-resort for banks’ short-term liq-
uidity needs. Hence, lack of adequate liquidity flows through these markets have the potential
to substantially impair real and financial sectors. If liquidity does not get channeled through
the banking system to its most efficient use, then intermediation to households and corporations
could stagnate. For instance, central banks’ transmission mechanism for monetary policy could
be rendered less effective if its liquidity provisions get trapped on bank balance-sheets instead
of lubricating the flow of credit amongst banks. In turn, central banks may be forced to resort
to emergency lending operations – perhaps at overly attractive terms, against risky collateral,
and to parts of the banking sector not generally accommodated in its operations (as has been
witnessed through a series of liquidity facilities created by the New York Federal Reserve, the
Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and other central banks during the crisis). While
such an outcome has its share of moral-hazard concerns, it is also accompanied by the misfor-
tune of laying the burden of monitoring and (at least some) credit-risk management, away from
peer-based inter-bank system on to central bank balance-sheet.
Our paper is an attempt to understand some of these effects by examining the behavior
of inter-bank markets during the crisis period of 2007–2008. We hypothesize and confirm a
precautionary motive to liquidity hoarding by banks during this period2 and investigate the
causal effect of such precautionary hoardings on inter-bank rates and other lending rates in the
economy. Our broad conclusion is that events unfolding since August 9, 2007 had the effect of
increasing the funding risk of banks, in response to which banks hoarded liquidity. This raised
the opportunity cost to banks of giving up their liquidity to provide insurance to other banks
in the inter-bank market. Hence, inter-bank lending rates rose for both secured and unsecured
lending with spillover effects on bank lending rates to the rest of the economy.
We focus on the Sterling Money Markets before and during the sub-prime crisis, specifically
1This was either due to reputational reasons or due to liquidity and credit guarantees that sponsoring banks
had contractually agreed to while setting up the SIV’s and conduits. See Acharya, Suarez and Schnabl (2009).
2Such a motive and its effect on markets and the economy has been mentioned often. See, for example, Financial
Times (FT) 12 August 2007: “Scramble for cash reflects fears for system”; FT 26 March 2008: “Hoarding by
banks stokes fear over crisis”; FT 19 May 2008: “Loans to banks limited despite market thawing”. As was put
succinctly in a quote by Marco Annunziata, chief economist at UniCredit bank: “It is unclear to what extent
hoarding of liquidity reflects a genuine need to stem rising losses, and to what extent it reflects an extremely
precautionary behavior driven by high uncertainty.”
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from January 2007 till the end of November 2008. Our choice of the Sterling markets is driven
primarily by the fact that the Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework offers an
attractive way of measuring a bank’s overnight liquidity as its reserves with the BoE. As we
explain in Section 2, the remuneration offered by the BoE on these reserves implies that it
is optimal for banks to park their liquidity in the form of these reserves.3 We construct an
aggregate measure of daily overnight liquidity held by the large, settlement banks.4
As our first piece of evidence, we show that aggregate bank liquidity experienced a significant
upward jump upon the onset of the sub-prime crisis (see Figure 1). Based on econometric tests
for structural breaks, aggregate liquidity experienced a 25% increase in the period immediately
starting 9th August, 2007, and a further 15% increase around 13th March, 2008 (the revelation
of severe funding problems and ultimately collapse of Bear Stearns).5
As our second piece of evidence, we show that this build up of bank liquidity was precau-
tionary in nature. First, we verify that banks hold more liquidity on days with greater volume
of payments and settlements activity, argued to be days with also greater uncertainty in liq-
uidity needs (Furfine, 2000). Such days are to an extent predictable in that there tend to be
significant calendar effects due to holidays and end of quarter days (among others) that cause
artificial bunching of several days’ or weeks’ settlement activity. In particular, the response of
bank liquidity to payment and settlement activity is non-existent in the pre-crisis period.
Next, we employ the bank-level variation in liquidity reserves, funding risk and economic
performance during the crisis. We find that banks with greater reliance on wholesale funding
and (eventually) made greater losses during the crisis, both in terms of recorded accounting losses
as well as declines in equity prices, hoarded more liquidity. Further, these banks also held more
liquidity in response to payment and settlement activity.6 We conclude that liquidity hoarding
occurred at banks in a significant measure due to their own funding or solvency concerns, and
not just due to the general lack of funding.
In our third piece of evidence, we study the effect of bank liquidity on interest rates in
the economy, inter-bank rates as well as other lending rates. First, we look at spread of the
inter-bank rates to Bank of England’s policy rate (in order to subsume any step-variations
induced by policy changes). We obtain overnight secured rates, based on the UK government’s
3In contrast, the Federal Reserve in the United States did not pay interest on reserves until October 2008.
4We exclude the two foreign banks since their liquidity kept in the form of the BoE reserves underestimates their
overall liquidity, possibly substantially. We also exclude one bank which became a settlement bank in the middle
of our sample period. And, we also study “total liquidity” that includes the bank collateral as under “double-
duty” this can be employed for intra-day borrowing from the BoE. This collateral which is held in fulfillment of
prudential requirements cannot be used to borrow overnight on the market. Our results are qualitatively similar
for overnight liquidity as well as total liquidity.
5While 9th August, 2007 is recognized by most as a crucial breakpoint, anecdotal evidence also supports the
second breakpoint of 13th March, 2008. See, for example, FT 9 April 2008: “UK banks seek higher borrowing
facilities”, and FT 10 April 2008: “UK banks seek more BoE borrowing”, which noted that “UK banks asked to
increase sharply the reserves they hold on deposit at the Bank this month to the highest ever level amid concerns
that the instability of the banking system could suddenly leave them desperate for cash. They fear another bank
crisis - akin to the collapse of US investment bank Bear Stearns - could see the market seize up. Banks have asked
to keep total reserves of £23.54bn on deposit that they can borrow to meet short-term financing needs if they
cannot borrow in the interbank market. This is up from the nearly £20bn they had on deposit until yesterday.
This is money the banks keep on deposit at the Bank, earning interest, but that they can access when the cost of
borrowing from other banks becomes too high.”
6The interaction effect is reversed for banks with more deposits as they have greater uncertainty in payment
activity due to depositor withdrawals adding significant uncertainty around special calendar days.
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GILT collateral, and unsecured rates and volumes from the British Bankers’ Association and
Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association. We study the behavior of inter-bank markets in the
period January 2007 till June 2008, when this paper was first drafted.
In linking liquidity to rates, there might be an important endogeneity problem at play: While
an exogenous shock to aggregate liquidity would be expected to enable inter-bank markets to
clear at lower rates, when aggregate liquidity is the endogenous outcome of banks’ strategic
choices, it may be correlated with the very factors that would cause the rates to rise. For example,
bank liquidity may have risen due to an anticipated shortage of aggregate liquidity which would
raise the opportunity cost to each bank of giving up liquidity to other banks. A shortage of
bank-level capital would have a similar effect on liquidity and rates. Bank liquidity may also be
responsive to expected rise in future inter-bank rates, for example, if distribution of liquidity was
expected to be highly concentrated with some players. And, banks may be hoarding liquidity
precisely due to high rates in inter-bank markets that in turn might be reflecting counterparty
risk concerns. Thus, identifying and quantifying the causal effect of liquidity on rates calls for
isolation of a component of liquidity that is exogenous to contemporaneous rates.
To this end, we exploit an idea based on Furfine (2000) that the payment and settlement
activity per se is not expected to affect inter-bank rates, other than through its effect on bank
liquidity. Crucially, since the payment and settlement activity is driven by calendar day effects,
we show that it tends to be essentially uncorrelated over time. Thus, a lagged measure of such ac-
tivity is potentially an instrument for bank liquidity while studying its effect on rates. Formally,
inter-bank rates on a given day depend on the liquidity reserves of banks on that day, which
we assume includes a component of reserves adjusted to yesterday’s payment and settlement
activity (the instrument) and a component adjusted in anticipation of today’s uncertainties (the
endogenous component). We conduct a three-stage least squares estimation linking liquidity to
rates and verify econometrically the validity of our instrument.
The results reveal a strong causal effect of liquidity on inter-bank rates, but in a manner that
differs sharply between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. When evaluated at the breakpoints of
aggregate liquidity (August 9, 2007 and March 13, 2008), the effect of (instrumented) liquidity
is to raise overnight inter-bank rates in the period during the crisis. In contrast, this relationship
is significantly negative in the period prior to the crisis. We do not find any significant effect
on volume, but what is striking is that the effect on secured rates is as high and significant
as the unsecured rates. Indeed, even the simple time-series plots of the overnight secured and
unsecured rates relative to BoE policy rate track each other rather well (see Figure 2). We do
not find much of an effect of daily aggregate liquidity on the 3-month rates and volumes (we
only have data on unsecured 3-month volume), however when we employ a 20-day lagged moving
average of aggregate liquidity, the effect on rates is again large and weakly significant.
We interpret these findings – especially the fact that effects on rates are similar for secured
and unsecured inter-bank lending – to imply that these markets experienced stress during the
crisis not per se due to counterparty risk concerns. Instead, the findings suggest that the stress
was most likely due to each bank engaging in liquidity hoarding due to a precautionary response
to its own heightened funding risk in markets for external finance (for example, wholesale mar-
kets) in wake of increased risk or anticipation of losses and capital shortfalls. The contrast
between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods lends further credibility to this conclusion.
This interpretation is potentially important also to understanding the apparently puzzling
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“stigma” associated with the use of central bank emergency lending facilities. The standard
assumption in money markets is that if the inter-bank rate is higher than the (say, the BoE)
policy rate, then banks release their surplus liquidity, if any, for “arbitrage” which involves
lending at the higher rate and borrowing at the policy rate. This activity should have the effect
of bringing the lending rate down to the policy rate. In normal times, there is no reason for banks
to be concerned that markets and investors might confuse the access of central bank’s emergency
lending facilities with solvency concerns of the arbitraging bank. Hence, this arbitrage works
well and the effect of aggregate bank liquidity shocks is to lower inter-bank rates. However,
in an environment where markets and investors are concerned about some risk of insolvency
at large, settlement banks but do not yet know which banks are likely to fail, the stigma in
accessing central bank emergency lending for arbitrage purposes is natural. Hence, in spite of a
central bank willing to borrow or lend in sufficient quantities at the policy rate, banks effectively
behave like financially constrained firms and charge more for transferring liquidity onto others.
Ex post, the solvency fears have turned out to be realistic and one could argue that the stigma
might in fact be a reflection of underlying insolvency problems.
Finally, we conduct two tests that show that the variability of inter-bank rates induced by
precautionary liquidity hoardings can have substantial economic effects. In one test, we ask the
question if the effect on the aggregate inter-bank rates is uniform for all borrowing banks or
limited to the crisis-affected ones. As mentioned above, banks that made greater losses in the
sub-prime crisis held higher precautionary liquidity reserves. It could be that the inter-bank
rates rose only for these banks and not for the other settlement banks. We find that this is not
the case. When we exploit the bank-level variation in the inter-bank unsecured borrowing rates
and allow it to be determined by bank’s own liquidity as well as that of other banks, we find
that it is other banks’ liquidity that causes the rates to move. And importantly, the group of
banks with low losses during the crisis are as exposed to rate rises (in response to other banks’
liquidity) as the group with high losses.7 This suggests a contagion-style systemic risk effect
could operate through inter-bank markets.
In another test, we show that the monthly household and corporate lending rates (fixed and
floating) as well as volumes respond to the variability in inter-bank rates. Overall, as inter-bank
rate rises, the lending rates to households and corporates rise and volumes shrink, showing a
transmission effect of money-market liquidity to the real economy. Again, at the individual bank
level, this transmission effect is stronger for banks that made higher losses during the crisis, and
the effect exists mostly during the crisis but not before.
Overall, this evidence suggests that central bank and regulatory attempts to thaw the money
market stress and reduce variability of inter-bank rates, if successful, can also have salubrious
effects on other parts of banking and real sectors. Our results, however, also suggest that to the
extent a part of the stress may emanate from liquidity hoardings of banks with troubled funding
and balance-sheet conditions, such thawing should involve addressing the insolvency issue (for
example, early supervision and stress tests, and recapitalization of troubled banks) rather than
just the lender-of-last-resort liquidity provisions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the relevant institutional
details of the UK payment system and money markets. Section 3 documents the regime switch
7Statistically, the effect is stronger for the group of banks with higher losses during the crisis, but the economic
magnitude is of the same order for both groups.
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in liquidity reserves of banks and Section 4 shows that liquidity hoardings of banks have a
precautionary aspect to them. Section 5 establishes the causal effect of liquidity hoardings on
inter-bank rates. Section 6 examines the effect of precautionary hoardings of a set of banks
and on other banks’ borrowing rates, and Section 7 studies the transmission of inter-bank rates
on to household and corporate lending. Section 8 relates our paper to literature and Section 9
concludes.
2 Institutional Background
This section provides some important background information. Section 2.1 describes the struc-
ture of the payment system and money markets in the UK. Section 2.2 provides an overview of
the Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework, focusing on the institutional and opera-
tional boundaries within which banks are able to manage the liquidity requirements arising from
their daily payment activity. Section 2.3 summarizes the range of adjustments to the framework
the BoE undertook since August 2007 to restore orderly conditions in money markets.
2.1 Tiered Structure of the UK Payment System and Money Markets8
There are about 400 active banks in the UK. The UK large-value payment system has a “tiered”
structure. Tiering means that many (usually smaller) second-tier banks do not settle at the
central bank but do so on the accounts of few (larger) first-tier banks also referred to as the
settlement banks or clearers. 15 banks are direct participants in the large-value payment system
called CHAPS (excluding the Bank of England). Two of the direct participants are foreign
owned banks with a narrow retail activity in the UK.
Money markets or inter-bank markets allow participants to manage short-term liquidity
positions. The tiered structure described above for the payment system is also reflected in
money-market activities. The key players in the Sterling market across all instruments and
maturities are the UK clearing banks, other large UK banks, and large US and European banks.
The provision of liquidity through the system operates via a ‘top-down’ structure. Along the
top tier, the big four ‘clearers’ provide funding horizontally to each other and vertically to
other counterparties (typically building societies and European banks with whom they have an
established relationship). Smaller players are not inclined to provide liquidity horizontally to
competitors and instead are more likely to pass it vertically up the system. So below the top
tier, horizontal movement is very limited.
2.2 Liquidity Management Under the Current Monetary Policy Framework9
An alternative to banks for obtaining short-term liquidity is to rely on reserves balances held
at the central bank. In the UK, a combination of reserves accounts, reserves averaging and
the standing facility corridor is used to limit volatility in overnight interest rates over each
maintenance period. Under the current monetary policy framework implemented in May 2006,
37 UK banks and building societies that are members of the scheme set their “target” balances
8This section relies on information collected from market participants.
9This section relies heavily on ”The framework for the Bank of England’s operations in the sterling money
markets (The ’Red Book’)” available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/054.htm and
Clews (2005).
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(reserves) at the beginning of each maintenance period (Monetary Policy Committee’s decision
date until the next) and undertake to hold balances, remunerated at the official Bank rate
(or the policy rate), that on average meet the pre-set target over the maintenance period.
Participation in the reserves-averaging scheme is voluntary other than for the fist-tier, or in
other words, settlement banks, which join the scheme automatically because their role in the
payments system entails them having reserves accounts, and so maintaining balances, with the
central bank. Prior to the crisis, if a member’s average balance was within a +/- 1% range around
the target (averaging reserves balances at the end of each calendar day over the maintenance
period as a whole), the balance would be remunerated at the official Bank rate.
Subject to meeting the monthly target balance and avoiding overnight overdrafts, reserves
balances can be varied freely to meet day-to-day liquidity needs. For example, funds can be
moved on and off reserves accounts up to the close of the payments system in order to accom-
modate unexpected end-of-day payment inflows and outflows. In this way, reserves balances can
be used by banks as a liquidity buffer.
Within the ceilings set on reserves targets, reserves banks can also change their reserves target
from month to month in response to, for example, variations in the size or uncertainty of their
payments flows. Settlement banks can also draw on reserves balances during the day to bridge
any gap between payments made and expected receipts. For this purpose, holding reserves is an
alternative to borrowing from the central bank during the day against eligible collateral. The
routine provision of intra-day liquidity to settlement banks against eligible collateral together
with reserves balances, provides the necessary lubricant for the working of the Sterling payments
system, ensuring that settlement banks are able to make payments in advance of expected
receipts later in the day. Intra-day lending from the BoE to the settlement banks is interest-
free, but it entails a large penalty if not reimbursed by the end of the day.
Individual institutions also need to have plans to manage liquidity in times of stress. Smaller
banks can obtain liquidity insurance from larger banks by paying for committed lines of credit.
But larger banks generally cannot buy insurance from each other without imposing an unaccept-
able level of (contingent) counterparty credit risk. Thus, they have to self-insure, which they
do in Sterling by holding either balances on their reserves account at the Bank or high-quality
assets that can be exchanged for central bank money in the open market operations (OMOs) or
through the Bank’s standing (or semantically, emergency) lending facility.
OMOs are used to provide to the banking system the amount of central bank money needed
to enable reserves banks, in aggregate, to achieve their reserves targets. OMOs comprise short-
term repos at the official Bank rate, long-term repos at market rates determined in variable-rate
tenders, and outright purchases of high-quality bonds The Bank of England (BoE) accepts as
counterparties in its open market operations (OMOs): (1) banks and building societies eligible to
participate in the reserves scheme; and (2) other banks, building societies and securities dealers
authorized under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that are active intermediaries in
the sterling markets. Standing deposit and (collateralized) lending facilities are also available to
eligible UK banks and building societies and may be used on demand. In normal circumstances
they carry a penalty, relative to the official Bank rate, of +/- 25 basis points on the final day of
the monthly reserves maintenance period, and of +/- 100 basis points on all other days.
An important event in Sterling money markets prior to the onset of the crisis in August
2007 was the so-called “uncovered” OMO. In an OMO to supply reserves, counterparties bid
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for a quantity at a fixed BoE Rate. This fixed-rate bidding has one potential undesirable
consequence that given the amount of reserves each counterparty actually desires, the size of
their bid is determined by their expectation (or guess) as to how much other counterparties will
bid for. That can set up a dynamic where, from week to week, the extent to which a short-term
repo OMO is covered is on a rising or falling trend. If, for example, a counterparty thinks its
peers will bid for much more than they in fact desire, then it too must do the same in order to
be allotted roughly what it actually wants. If the cover ratio is on a declining dynamic, that
can potentially lead eventually to an “uncovered” OMO, as happened in June 2007, before the
turmoil, which means that reserves are undersupplied and interbank rates go up dramatically
due to lack of reserves relative to banks’ targets.
The Money Market Liaison Group at Bank of England thought that the reaction to the
uncovered OMO in end of June 2007 may have reflected some money market participants not
fully appreciating how the Bank’s sterling monetary framework was supposed to work. But it
provided a useful case study and a repeat was thought unlikely. From the standpoint of our
analysis, the uncovered OMO raises the issue that any differential effect we observe pre- and
during the crisis might be due to the July 2007 episode. We address this throughout the paper
by always controlling through a dummy variable for the uncovered OMO episode.
2.3 Adjustments to the Monetary Policy Framework during the Sub-Prime
Turmoil
The current monetary policy framework of the Bank of England is also designed to enable
it to continue achieving its primary rate-setting objective while responding to any sudden or
pronounced shifts in demand for central bank money. Such changes might occur in the face of
major operational or financial disruptions to the Sterling money markets or their supporting
infrastructure. In such circumstances, demand for central bank money might rise if the money
markets were no longer working effectively to distribute reserves around the banking system.
Hence, during the current turbulence the BoE undertook a range of adjustments to its framework
giving leeway for banks to build up larger liquidity buffers:
(1) On September 13th and 18th 2007, the BoE offered an extra £4.4bn (each time) in its
regular weekly open market operations, amounting to 25% of the aggregate reserves target for
the current maintenance period. This was accommodated by an increase in the reserves band
around target from 1% to 37.5%. These actions were taken to help offset the disturbance to
conditions in the short-term money markets following the announcement of lender of last resort
assistance to Northern Rock on September 14th 2007.
(2) The BoE further announced on 19th September 2007 that in order to alleviate strains in
longer-maturity money markets it would conduct auctions to provide funds at 3 month maturity
against a wider range of collateral (including mortgage collateral) than in the BoE’s weekly open
market operations.
(3) For the maintenance period beginning on October 4th 2007, the ranges around reserves
banks’ targets within which reserves are remunerated were widened from +/-1% to +/-30%. The
target ranges remained at this level until July 10th 2008 when they were reduced to +/-20%.
Further, in view of the increase in the reserves targets set by reserves scheme members and the
potential for future increase, with effect from the maintenance period starting on May 8th 2008,
the BoE more than doubled the reserves target ceiling it sets for each reserves scheme member.
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(4) On April 21st 2008, the BoE introduced the special liquidity scheme to deal with the
overhang of existing assets on banks’ balance sheets. The scheme allows banks and building
societies to swap for up to three years some of their illiquid assets for liquid Treasury Bills. In
other words, the purpose of the Scheme is to finance part of the overhang of currently illiquid
assets by exchanging them temporarily with more easily tradable assets. The banks can then use
these assets to finance themselves more normally. All of the banks and building societies that
are eligible to sign up for the standing deposit and lending facilities within the Bank’s Sterling
Monetary Framework are able to take part in the Scheme.
With this background description, we move to the analysis of bank liquidity.
3 Regime Shifts in Bank Liquidity
In this section we use an event study approach to investigate first-tier (settlement) banks’ liq-
uidity holdings during the crisis.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We measure the aggregate overnight liquidity as the sum of the reserves accounts held by the
ten UK first-tier banks at the central bank and measured at 5 am each day. The total liquidity
is the sum of their overnight liquidity and their intra-day liquidity. The intra-day liquidity is
the aggregate maximum collateral settlement banks post during a day to obtain intra-day credit
from the central bank, including the collateral held overnight in fulfillment of regulatory liquidity
requirement. The data are obtained from the Bank of England. All data are daily and most of
our tests cover the period 02 January 2007 to 30 June 2008.
Table 1 reports various descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maxi-
mum, quantiles) of the overnight and total liquidity held by first-tier banks. This is reported
for three periods: whole sample period (Panel 1a), pre-August 9th 2007 (Panel 1b) and post-
August 9th 2007 (Panel 1c). Panel 1d reports a test of the difference in means between the
two sub-periods. The overnight liquidity is 27 per cent higher post August 9th and the total
liquidity 24 per cent higher. These differences are significant statistically at the 1% level. For
both variables however, we notice that the standard deviation is similar across the two periods.
This suggests that the variations in the means resulted from abrupt permanent rises in the level
of both series.
3.2 Event Study
To understand these shifts in banks liquidity further, we identify the exact periods when banks re-
vised their liquidity demand and relate these to relevant market news obtained from Bloomberg’s
real-time news service. We employ the Bai and Perron (1998) test which estimates the timing of
permanent level shifts in a time series. This method applies a sequential algorithm that searches
all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the set that produces the
maximum goodness-of-fit. Statistical tests then determine whether the improved fit produced
by allowing an additional break is sufficiently large given what would be expected by chance
(due to noise). We apply the test to the total and the overnight liquidity.
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3.2.1 Total Liquidity
Table 2a reports the test results for total liquidity. The first column reports the break dates.
The second column gives the 95% confidence interval for each break point. The third column
provides the estimated mean of the (log) liquidity series considered for each window. The fourth
column details headlines on dates over the period 1 May 2007 to 30 June 2008 falling within the
95% confidence interval for any break point shown in bold.
The total liquidity (in logarithm) and estimated breaks are also plotted in Figure 1. The test
identifies two upward breaks in the total liquidity. A first 7.2% increase in the total liquidity
occurred on March 3th 2007 and a further 20% increase on August 8th 2007. The first break
is modest in comparison to the second and does not coincide with any key market event. In
contrast, August 9th 2007 is widely believed to be the date of money market “freeze” in the UK,
European and US money markets, and coincides with the first negative news announcement by a
major European bank in Bloomberg headlines. For two weeks in August BNP Paribas suspended
redemptions from three money market funds because they did not feel they could fairly value
their positions. Before BNP’s announcement, loss announcements and other negative news in
the headlines were concentrated in the United States, primarily Bear Stearns’ hedge funds and
also some monoline insurers. A cascade of loss announcements, primarily unscheduled, from
US and European banks followed immediately after BNP’s announcement as many banks were
forced to honor the liquidity and credit enhancements they had sold to asset-backed special
purpose vehicles or in some cases take these assets back on balance sheets.
This is preliminary evidence that the most significant break point in total liquidity series
potentially reflects a response to the additional funding needs due to recourse of assets back
to bank balance-sheets and heightened funding risk as banks could no longer raise overnight
financing from short-term asset-backed commercial paper as they were used to. Instead, banks
would now have to tap into other forms of borrowing such as through inter-bank markets or
repo markets or do external capital-raising which is costly both in terms of adverse selection
costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and dilution costs arising from debt overhang (Myers, 1977).
3.2.2 Overnight Liquidity
Table 2b reports results for the overnight liquidity. The test identifies two breaks in the overnight
liquidity. The first break, a 24% increase in overnight liquidity, occurred around September
11th 2007. This is one month later than the major break in the total liquidity. This break
is delayed because banks are allowed to revise their reserves targets only from one Monetary
Policy Committee meeting to the next. Figure 3 shows that the first increase in the aggregate
reserves target occurred on September 6th 2007, the date the first MPC meeting took place after
the sub-prime crisis took hold. One can observe in Table 2b further increases in the overnight
liquidity from mid-September onwards following the BoE decisions to inject extra liquidity in
its regular weekly open market operations. For the October maintenance period, banks chose a
higher target – around 20% higher than the aggregate target for the August maintenance period.
At the second break, March 13th 2008, first-tier banks increased their overnight liquidity by
an additional 15.5%. The second break coincides exactly with the collapse of Bear Stearns in
the US. Bear Stearns episode reflected yet another freeze, this time in the market for borrowing
secured against highly rated asset-backed securities. Traditionally, banks had always assumed
they would be able to access this market – the so-called overnight repo market – for short-term
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liquidity needs. The Bear Stearns collapse revealed however that banks could no longer assume
in their liquidity stress tests that the worst case scenario was simply the drying up of unsecured
funding, but that secured funding may dry up too. This further intensified the funding needs
and risks faced by banks and the liquidity response of banks is thus again consistent with a
precautionary motive.10
While the higher reserves targets may have reflected anticipation of heightened funding needs
and risks, one needs to consider also the fact that banks had access to BoE’s standing facilities
as an alternative. Hence, the preference for reserves as a way of building liquidity also reflects a
reduced tolerance for the risk of using BoE’s standing facilities, most likely due to the potential
“stigma” of accessing them during period of market stress. Specifically, the marginal benefit
of an additional unit of reserves is the insurance it provides against having to use the standing
facilities (SF) following an unexpected payment shock in late trading. The expected cost of
using the SF is a function of the direct penalty in using it (which remained constant or in fact
was lowered by the BoE during the crisis), the indirect penalty due to stigma, and the size
of unexpected payment shocks. This cost must be traded off against the opportunity cost of
not deploying elsewhere an additional unit of reserves, which is typically the spread between
policy rate and the overnight (secured) market rate. Within a maintenance period, settlement
banks can increase their liquidity buffer either by reducing lending to households and firms or
by reducing net lending to second-tier banks. Across maintenance periods, i.e., from one MPC
meeting to another, reserves targets can themselves be varied.
4 Evidence of the Precautionary Motive
In order to tease this tradeoff faced by banks in building up reserves, we examine the explanatory
power of payment shock uncertainty for aggregate liquidity and of bank-level funding risks for
bank-level liquidity.
4.1 Aggregate Evidence
Our first test of the precautionary motive consists of estimating changes in aggregate liquidity in
response to changes in aggregate payment activity. The underlying idea is that on days of high
aggregate payment activity, some individual banks might end up with significant payment needs
but the distribution – that is which individual banks will face these needs – is uncertain. The
data for payment activity are from the Bank of England payment database. The daily payment
activity is measured as the sum of all transactions that flow through the large-value payment
system (CHAPS), net of interbank loans activity, value measuring the Sterling amount and
volume measuring the number of transactions. A higher payment value controlling for number
of transactions implies greater payment risk; conversely, higher payment volume controlling for
payment value implies small size transactions and lower payment risk.
10 Note that the liquidity demand of banks in this case reacted more or less immediately due to the BoE decision
on October 4th 2007 to widen the band around target within which reserves are remunerated from +/-1% to +/-
30%. If there is an upward shock to aggregate reserves demand within a maintenance period, the Bank can widen
the range to allow it supply additional reserves without penalizing banks or needing to drain reserves later in
the maintenance period. In March 2008, the wider (+/-30%) range allowed the Bank to supply the additional
reserves to the banking sector without further changes to the range.
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Table 1 shows the summary statistics for payment value and volume pre-crisis and during
the crisis. Strikingly, there is virtually no difference in the economic magnitude of payment
activity by itself over the two periods. This is important for our identification to follow as any
differential response of bank liquidity to this activity must thus arise from the perceived cost
of managing payment shocks through means other than liquidity reserves. Figures 4 and 5 plot
the payment activity in value and volume (in logarithm), respectively. At first sight, these series
appear to be white noise processes. A Portmanteau test confirms this observation. For both
series the lag-one autoregressive coefficients are small (not reported). The Portmanteau test for
lag-one has p-value of 0.29 for the aggregate payment value and 0.12 for the aggregate payment
volume rejecting the null hypothesis that the first lag autocorrelation is different from zero.
Importantly though, payment risk measured as changes in aggregate payment activity is in
fact predictable by banks due to calendar effects. In fact, APACS, the UK payments association,
claim to be able to forecast close to 100 per cent of the fluctuations in payment flows. Table
3 reports the effects of a non-exhaustive set of calendar dummies on payment activity, which
includes holidays in United States and the United Kingdom, and fixed effects for day of the
week, quarter, and beginning and end of each month. With these few dummies we are able to
predict 75 per cent of the variation in the payment volume and 40 per cent of the variation in
payment value. Important calendar effects are (i) United States holidays which are associated
with a 58 per cent drop in the value of payments activity, (ii) Days around the United Kingdom
holidays when there are, for instance, higher than usual deposit withdrawals; and (iii) fourth
quarter effect which is negative also.
To investigate how banks adjusted their liquidity reserves in aggregate at the start of the
day in response to payment activity measured at the end of the day (which we have shown to
be predictable due to calendar effects), and whether this adjustment differed before and during
the crisis, we estimate the following specification: OLiqt = αo · Pt +
3∑
s=2
βso · Pt ∗ breakst +
3∑
s=1
γso · breakst + δo · Zt + εot ,
TLiqt = αl · Pt + βl · Pt ∗ break1t + γl · break1t + δl · Zt + εlt ,
(1)
where OLiqt is the aggregate overnight liquidity on day t, TLiqt is the total liquidity, P is a
vector of measures of aggregate payment activity (the volume and the value), and all quantities
(payment activity and liquidity) are in logarithm. The breaks are based on estimations in Table
2: break1t is a post August 8th 2007 dummy; break
2
t is a post September 11th 2007 dummy;
break3t is a post March 13th 2008 dummy. Zt is a vector of control variables including a dummy
for days in the last week of June 2007 when the uncovered OMO occurred (see Section 2.2
explaining why we need to control for this failed OMO that affected interbank markets prior
to onset of the crisis); a dummy that takes value one on days when the regular weekly open
market operations take place (every Thursday); maintenance days’ fixed effects; and dummies
marking two periods when alternative adjustments to the monetary policy framework were in
place: the widening of bands around target between October 5th 2007 and May 1st 2008; and
the higher ceiling set on reserves targets from May 2nd 2008 onwards. Including these dummies
helps control for shifts that one-time adjustments to the monetary policy framework might have
caused on the aggregate liquidity.
The system is estimated using seemingly-unrelated-least-squares (SURE). The estimates are
reported in Table 4. The results in columns (1) through (6) show that the settlement banks
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react to an (expected) increase in payment value on day t by holding more liquidity in aggregate
at the start of the day. Controlling for the aggregate payment value a decline in the aggregate
payment volume, i.e. an increase in the average payment size, also causes settlement banks to
hold larger buffers at the start of the day. Interestingly in columns (3) and (5), for the overnight
liquidity, the effect is significant statistically only during the crisis, that is, following September
11th 2007 (break2t ), the first MPC date after the onset of the crisis. In other words, aggregate
bank liquidity rose more on days with high payment activity in terms of value, during the crisis
but not before, consistent with a precautionary response to an increase in funding risk faced by
banks in managing the risk of payment shortfalls. In terms of magnitude, in column (3) a one
per cent increase in aggregate payment value is associated with a 0.27 percent increase in the
overnight liquidity during the crisis.11
4.2 Bank-level Evidence
Our second test of the precautionary motive exploits daily bank-level data. We relate the
individual liquidity buffers of banks to the payment risk on the same day and to individual bank
characteristics using the specification: OLiqit = αo · Pt +
3∑
s=2
βso · Pt ∗ breakst +
3∑
s=2
γso ·Xi(t) ∗ breakst +
3∑
s=1
δso · breakst + θo · Zt + ωoi + εot ,
TLiqit = αl · Pt + βl · Pt ∗ break1t + γl ·Xi(t) ∗ break1t + δl · break1t + θl · Zt + ωli + εlt ,
(2)
where in new notation, i stands for a bank subscript, ωi is a bank fixed effect, and Xi is a
vector of three variables measuring banks’ realized health during the crisis and its funding risk
due to maturity mismatch measured at the inception of the crisis: (1) losses disclosed (which
include write-offs) in the period from June 2007 to March 2008 as a ratio of total assets; (2) the
ratio of retail to interbank deposits in June 2007 (i.e. pre-crisis); and (3) the equity price fall
relative to mean 2006 valuation and normalized by 2006 standard deviation. Losses disclosed are
an imperfect measure of realized solvency issues since some banks were prompter at reporting
losses than other banks. The ratio of retail to wholesale deposits accounts for the fact that
while some banks were not directly threatened by the meltdown of the ABCP market, they
were rendered fragile by the dry up of wholesale financing markets due to their relatively small
deposit base.12 Finally, equity price fall should incorporate all public information available on
the financial condition of a bank, including anticipation of losses and not just realized losses.
All other variables are as in system (1), except that because of large differences in size
between banks, rather than taking logarithms directly, the overnight liquidity for a bank is
normalized by subtracting the bank’s mean and dividing by the bank’s standard deviation of
liquidity calculated over the first twelve months of the sample. In this way, we focus on abnormal
11In columns (5) and (6), it is noteworthy that the flexibility introduced by the widening of the bands around
reserves target and the higher ceiling set on reserves target led settlement banks to reduce their overnight liquidity
buffers by about 13 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively, relative to the period August-September 2007.
12A classic example of this is the run on Northern Rock in September 2007. Shin (2009) provides descriptive
statistics showing that Northern Rock’s reliance on securitization was not an immediate factor in its failure since
its securitization vehicles issued long-term notes to investors, but that its problem stemmed from its high leverage
coupled with reliance on institutional investors for short-term funding. An analysis of the structure of its balance
sheet pre- and post-run shows that the first and most damaging run on the bank took place in its short- and
medium-term wholesale liabilities.
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variations in each bank’s liquidity. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables
used in the estimation. There is significant variability across banks in the measures of bank
health and funding risk. For all banks, retail deposits are larger than interbank deposits but
the ratio varies between 1.4 and 17. More than 50 per cent of the banks in our sample did not
report any losses as of March 2008, but all did between then and end of our sample period.
Equity prices experienced dramatic swings over the sample period for many banks.
Table 6a reports the SURE estimates of the specification for bank-level overnight liquidity13.
The precautionary liquidity response to variations in payment activity is confirmed. As in Table
4, on average banks increase their overnight liquidity buffers in response to larger transactions
(lower volume for same total value of payments). In contrast to Table 4 however, bank-level
estimates show a liquidity response to larger payment value only following March 13th 2008
(break3t ).
Column (2) shows that banks which reported larger losses during the crisis increased liquidity
reserves more immediately after September 11th 2007 (break2t ); whereas Column (3) shows a
similar effect for banks relying less on retail deposits relative to interbank deposits. Columns
(4) and (5) examine the interaction of these two effects and show that banks which are more
vulnerable to an interbank market freeze (low retail to interbank deposits ratio) hoarded more
liquidity if they subsequently also reported larger losses, and vice-versa. Also column (6) shows
that banks which lost more stock market value following September 11th 2007 (relative to
2006 valuations) built larger liquidity buffers during the crisis. These effects are all significant
at conventional levels and large in terms of economic magnitude. For instance, banks which
disclosed a loss ratio one standard deviation above the mean increased their overnight liquidity
by an additional 25 per cent of a standard deviation.
In Table 6b we allow for heterogeneity in the precautionary reaction of banks, based on their
three characteristics, to payment risk. In column (1) we allow the coefficients on payment value
and payment volume to vary for banks which disclosed higher than median losses and banks
which disclosed lower than median losses. The precautionary reaction to payment risk is about
50 per cent larger for banks which reported higher than median losses. Column (2) shows that
the precautionary reaction to payment risk is higher for those banks that relied less on wholesale
funding. At first sight this is counter-intuitive but it is explained by the fact that payment shocks
are more likely for the large retail banks14. In column (3) the precautionary reaction to payment
risk is larger for those banks whose equity price declined more during the crisis. The liquidity
demand of low risk banks also reacts more to fluctuations in the aggregate payments activity, but
only post-March 2008, but their reaction in addition to being less immediate, is about one-third
smaller in magnitude.
To sum up, the findings in the section confirm our hypothesis that the increase in the
aggregate liquidity witnessed during the crisis has been (at least partly) precautionary. During
the crisis banks hoarded liquidity against predictable payment shocks, but not so pre-crisis.
Further, this precautionary reaction was unequal across banks being more pronounced at weaker
13In interest of space, we do not report the estimates for total liquidity which are qualitatively similar. These
estimates are available upon request.
14We checked this by regressing each group’s fraction of the aggregate payment activity on the same calendar
effects similar to those used in Table 4. The results revealed that the calendar effects explain a larger fraction
of the payment activity of the retail banks than the non-retail banks, likely due to deposit withdrawal shocks
around holidays. These results are available upon request.
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banks and banks with greater funding risk.
5 Effect of Liquidity Hoarding on Money Markets
In the second half of the paper, starting with this section, we explore what were the conse-
quences of the increase in hoarding of liquidity by first-tier banks for inter-bank markets, and
subsequently the real economy. We investigate these issues in turn, investigating in this section
how movements in liquidity demand by banks altered inter-bank rates and volumes before and
during the crisis.
5.1 Revised Arbitrage Condition in Stressed Conditions
Theoretically, banks set reserves targets to equal the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of
holding one additional unit of reserves. In normal times, the cost of using the standing lending
facility to meet liquidity needs is low due to the absence of stigma. Then, reserves averaging over
a maintenance period ensures by “arbitrage” that market interest rates do not diverge materially
from the policy rate. The arbitrage works as follows. For instance, if overnight market interest
rates are higher on a particular day than the policy rate, a bank can run down its reserves
balance in order to lend in the market, expecting to be able to borrow more cheaply in the
market in order to hold higher reserves balances on subsequent days. By contrast, if market
rates are lower, a bank can borrow in the market in order to build up its reserves balance.
Typically, the effectiveness of this arbitrage mechanism is affected by the width of the range of
reserves allowed by the monetary policy implementation and by the willingness of banks to take
reserves close to the edge of their ranges given that unexpected late payment flows could leave
them needing to use a standing facility at the end of the day.
In stressed conditions, however, the stigmatization of the standing facility is high and this
can curb active liquidity management by banks. The incentive is for banks to hold larger buffers
over the maintenance period to reduce the risk of having to use the standing lending facility
to meet unexpected late payment shocks. The private benefit of holding one additional unit of
reserves is high and hence banks charge a high liquidity premium to release their reserves. In
other words, in stressed conditions banks release their excess precautionary liquidity only if the
return on liquidity exceeds the high private benefit, causing interbank rates to be higher.
In our empirical work, we aim to identify both these effects: first, on liquidity hoarding of
banks between normal and stressed times, and second, of liquidity hoardings on interbank rates,
in particular, on the deviation between interbank rates and Bank of England policy rates.
5.2 Measuring the Liquidity Effect : An Instrumental Variables Approach
A correct identification of the causal effect of variations in liquidity demand on money market
rates ought to correct for reverse causality and omitted variables bias. Overnight rates may
deviate from the policy rate due to a number of factors other than variations in the aggregate level
of overnight liquidity. For example, the secured overnight rate can deviate from the policy rate
because the central bank accepts a wider range of collateral than just gilts and allows collateral
substitution through the life of the transaction. And unsecured rates embody a premium for
counterparty risk so can deviate from target because of credit, rather than liquidity, factors.
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To address these issues, we once again exploit variations in payment and settlement activity.
Section 2.2 highlighted mechanisms whereby payment activity correlates with the settlement
banks’ overnight liquidity buffer and Section 4.1 provided supporting evidence. We take advan-
tage of this relationship in teasing out the effect of bank liquidity on money market rates.
Formally, we specify liquidity on day t (measured at the start of the day) lt as an autore-
gressive process of order one:
lt = αlt−1 + βPt + εlt , (3)
where the precautionary demand for liquidity is captured by the dependence of lt on Pt, the
payment activity on day t (assuming banks are able to make a reasonable forecast of their
payment activity). We assume based on evidence presented in Section 4.1 (see Figures 4 and 5)
that Pt is a white noise process:
Pt = εPt (4)
Then, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
lt = α2lt−2 + αβPt−1 + βPt + εlt (5)
In other words, (within a maintenance period) liquidity at time t is a function of all the past
history of payment activity. Next, we write the interbank market rate rt as a linear function of
both lt and Pt :
rt = γlt + δPt + εrt (6)
That the market rate on a given day is a direct function of the payment activity on that day
follows from Furfine (2000). His argument goes as follows. Payment flows on any given day are
positively correlated with reserves balance uncertainty. As uncertainty generates a precautionary
demand for reserves, days with higher payment flows are associated with upward pressure on
the market rate. In other words, on busier days, banks desire to hold a larger cushion of reserves
to protect against penalties for overnight overdrafts. In equilibrium, this generates a positive
relationship between payments volume and the market rate. If this argument holds Pt is not
a valid instrumental variable for lt, in studying the effect of liquidity lt on interbank rate rt.
However,because Pt is a white noise process Pt−1 is potentially a valid instrument for lt.
5.3 Measuring the Liquidity Effect : Results
5.3.1 Money Markets Data
Interest rates and volume data are from the British Bankers’ Association and Wholesale Markets
Brokers’ Association. The secured rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate both for overnight
and 3-month. The unsecured overnight rate is the SONIA15 rate for overnight and the Libor
for 3 month. The 3-month unsecured volume is from the Bank of England; derived using an
algorithm similar to Furfine (1999) adjusted to account for an interest payment larger than that
for overnight loans.
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics of the data. The unsecured rate spread to policy rate
is unchanged during the crisis. The secured rate spread to policy rate is 2.41 basis points higher
during the crisis than pre-crisis but with huge variability both immediately before and during
15SONIA stands for sterling overnight index average. It tracks actual Sterling overnight funding rates experi-
enced by market participants.
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the crisis. Term rates, in particular the 3-month Libor, skyrocketed during the crisis with their
spread over the overnight index swap spread having jumped from 10 bps to 70 bps.
An apparently puzzling observation is that the secured (Gilt) rate has increased more than
the unsecured rate. Coincidentally, both the secured volume and the unsecured volume have
increased post-August 9th 2007, but the increase has been more than twice larger for secured
lending (45 per cent against 13 per cent). As we explain below, this might indicate a heightened
market segmentation during the crisis, that is, different sets of banks borrowing in the two
markets.16 Note that a deterioration in the quality of collateral pledged cannot be an explanation
for why secured rates have increased more from before crisis to during the crisis, compared to
unsecured rates, because we focus on the Gilt rate where quality of collateral was close to
unquestionable (at least until the Lehman bankruptcy).
Term unsecured (CHAPS) volume has increased by 19 per cent during the crisis, i.e., much
less than overnight lending. This, combined with the observation that term spreads skyrocketed,
suggests that increases in supply were insufficient to meet increases in demand in term markets
more than in overnight markets. In other words, the compensation demanded by UK banks
to lend to other banks over periods longer than overnight rose coincidentally with the rise in
the aggregate demand for liquidity, and explains why interbank lending became increasingly
concentrated at shorter maturities. Figure 2 shows that sharp movements in the overnight
secured rate have coincided with negative market news, e.g., loss announcements and bailouts.17
Figure 6 shows positive co-movements between the overnight liquidity and the overnight secured
rate during the crisis. Figure 7 shows a similar pattern for the 3-month Libor.
5.3.2 Regression Specification
We estimate both price and quantity effects in Sterling money markets and link them to vari-
ations in aggregate liquidity using three-stage-least squares (3SLS). Three stage least squares
is a combination of multivariate seemingly-unrelated regressions (SURE) and two stage least
squares. It obtains instrumental variable estimates, also taking into account the covariances
across equation disturbances. If the error terms of the different equations are correlated across
equations, then joint estimation of the equations is able to exploit this cross equations correlation
to obtain more efficient estimates.
The basic specification we estimate is as follows:
Yt = αy ·OLiqt +
3∑
s=2
βsy ·OLiqt ∗ breakst +
3∑
s=1
γsy · breakst + δy · Zt + εyt ,
OLiqt = αo · Pt−1 +
3∑
s=2
βso · Pt−1 ∗ breakst +
3∑
s=1
γso · breakst + δo · Zt + εot ,
(7)
where Yt is a vector of four variables: the secured (GC) rate spread to policy rate (in basis points);
16The theoretical models explain the use of collateral as a mechanism to reduce equilibrium credit rationing
(Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) and other problems that arise due to asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders. Collateral induces borrowers to sort themselves ex ante (Bester (1985) and Beaudry and Poitevin (1995))
and/or improve their incentives ex post (Gale and Hellwig (1985)), potentially mitigating problems generated
by information gaps between borrowers and lenders. The central implication of these theoretical models is that a
shrinking of the information gap between borrowers and lenders should lower the incidence of collateral.
17An uncovered OMO caused a peak in overnight rates in the last week of June 2007. The underbidding in the
OMO on June 28th 2007 was explained by a shortage of gilts and other eligible collateral available for borrowing
in the securities lending market. See the explanation provided in Section 2.2.
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the SONIA unsecured rate spread to policy rate; the secured lending volume in logarithm and
the unsecured lending volume also in logarithm. All other variables are as in system (1).
5.3.3 Results
The estimation results are reported in Table 8 for the overnight market. For comparison, SURE
estimates are reported in Panel 8a. Panel 8b reports the 3SLS estimates. The conclusions are
robust across alternative specifications though 3SLS (or IV) estimates are larger than SURE
estimates and we focus primarily on these.
In terms of the instrument itself, for all specifications the over-identification test statistics
validate our instrumental variables. The first-stage estimation of the relationship between the
previous day payment activity and the current overnight liquidity buffer is reported in the last
part of Table 8b. There is a positive relationship between the current overnight liquidity and the
previous day value of payment activity. Controlling for the value of payment activity, positive
variations in the previous day volume of payment activity are associated with a lower current
liquidity buffer held by first tier-banks, confirming that days of high retail payment activity
like Easter and Christmas cash withdrawal days are followed by a decline in the stock of cash
settlement banks hold on their reserves accounts. Controlling for the value of payment activity,
positive variations in the previous day volume of payment activity also means smaller payments.
A larger payment may entail a larger delay cost for banks if the payment size is correlated
positively with the size of the customer account. Hence a bank would want to hold a larger
liquidity buffer to avoid the cost of having to delay large value payments.
Consider now the results showing the effect of aggregate liquidity on interbank rates. We
focus on our preferred specification column (3). While before the crisis a greater overnight
liquidity buffer is associated with a significant decline in overnight spreads, during the crisis the
liquidity effect (that is, the coefficient on OLiqt ∗ break2t ) is zero to marginally positive. This
is true both for the secured and unsecured rates. The impact on the secured rate tends to be
slightly larger. In terms of magnitude, pre crisis a 10 per cent increase in the overnight liquidity
buffer is associated with a 6.6 basis points decline in the secured spread. Post September 11th
2007 a 10 per cent increase in the overnight liquidity buffer is associated with a 1.1 basis points
rise in the secured spread. This result confirms our theory whereby in stressed conditions banks
release their (precautionary) excess liquidity at a liquidity premium that exceeds the direct cost
of using the standing facility and the indirect stigma cost.
Note that in column (3), we do not dummy out the uncovered OMO. Instead, we exploit
the uncovered OMO as an exogenous source of variation in rates pre-crisis. This allows us to
estimate the liquidity effect more precisely due to the larger variability in the data created by
the uncovered OMO. Conversely, column (4) confirms that pre-crisis both secured and unsecured
rates skyrocketed as a result of the liquidity shortage generated by the uncovered OMO.
Interestingly, there is no significant incremental effect post 13 March 2008. The coefficient
on OLiqt ∗ break3t is not significant statistically and is negative when the dependent variable is
the secured spread. The negative sign might suggest that the relationship between the aggregate
liquidity and the secured spread is non-linear, but we would expect in that case a similar non-
linearity to show up when the dependent variable is the unsecured spread. A possible reason
there is no incremental effect at the second break might be that apart from the two weeks
following the Bear Stearns collapse orderly conditions were restored for the period going from
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end-March to end of our sample period. In particular, as described in Section 2.3, on April
21st 2008, the BoE introduced the special liquidity scheme to deal with the overhang of existing
assets on banks’ balance sheets, allowing banks and building societies to swap for up to three
years some of their illiquid assets for liquid Treasury Bills.
Regressions where the dependent variables are volumes traded (second part of Table 8b)
show that the secured volume has increased more than the unsecured volume (the coefficient
on break1t is 0.278 for the secured volume and 0.232 for the unsecured volume). Interestingly,
quantity effects become most significant as the crisis deepens. Post March 13th 2008 (break3)
a 1 percentage point increase in OLiqt is associated with a 3.4 percentage points decline in
the overnight secured volume. Possible interpretations are twofold. A first interpretation, con-
sistent with the fact that orderly conditions were restored post March 2008 until end of our
sample period, leading to overnight secured borrowing being substituted by term secured bor-
rowing. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis because term secured volume data are
not available. But such a rise in maturity would have been supported by the introduction of the
Special Liquidity Scheme on 21 April 2008, which allowed banks to swap illiquid assets against
Treasury-Bills to be used as collateral in the market. A second interpretation is that there was
credit rationing associated with banks hoarding liquidity in the second phase of the crisis. In
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) the interest rate which a bank is willing to pay acts as a screening
device: banks who are willing to pay a high interest rate may on average be worse risk. A bank
would not lend to another bank who is screened high risk. Bear Stearns’ collapse for instance
was triggered by its inability to borrow secured against highly rated asset-backed securities.
The effect on the unsecured volume is not statistically significant. This might be explained
by the fact that the unsecured market is more segmented than the secured market. Indeed while
the secured market is open to a large pool of financial institutions (including investment banks,
and other non-commercial banks) the unsecured market is concentrated amongst the settlement
banks who access it to manage liquidity shocks arising from their daily payments activity.
In Table 9 we report estimates of the liquidity effect on 3 months secured and unsecured
spreads (volumes are not available). In columns (1) to (3), there is no evidence that term
markets are dependent on day-to-day variations in the aggregate liquidity. In columns (4) to
(6) we estimate the effect of permanent variations in the aggregate liquidity. To do this, we use
the 20 days moving average of the aggregate liquidity. This approach is not perfect, however
interestingly now the results show a positive effect of permanent variations in the aggregate
liquidity on both secured and unsecured term rates (significant at the 10 per cent level) during
the crisis. The liquidity effect on the 3-month Libor is large. A 10 per cent increase in the
overnight liquidity causes a 26 basis points jump in the 3-month Libor.
We interpret these findings – especially the fact that effects on rates are similar for secured
and unsecured inter-bank lending – to imply that these markets experienced stress during the
crisis not per se due to counterparty risk concerns. Instead, the findings suggest that the stress
was most likely due to each bank engaging in liquidity hoarding due to a precautionary response
to its own heightened funding risk in markets for external finance (for example, wholesale mar-
kets) in wake of increased risk or anticipation of losses and capital shortfalls. The contrast
between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods lends further credibility to this conclusion.
Overall, we interpret these findings – especially the fact that effects on rates are similar
for secured and unsecured inter-bank lending – to imply that these markets experienced stress
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during the crisis not per se due to counterparty risk concerns. Instead, the findings suggest that
the stress was most likely due to each bank engaging in liquidity hoarding due to a precaution-
ary response to its own heightened funding risk in markets for external finance (for example,
wholesale markets) in wake of increased risk or anticipation of losses and capital shortfalls. The
contrast between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods lends further credibility to this conclusion.
6 Contagion Effect
We showed earlier that the regime shifts in aggregate overnight liquidity can be explained by a
precautionary reaction at weaker banks. We also showed that the rise in aggregate liquidity in
the crisis raised average interbank rates. This latter effect could be due to a rise in the borrowing
cost of weaker banks and/or due to a rise in the lending rates of weaker banks. In this section,
we try to separate these effects. Specifically, we investigate whether the idiosyncratic reactions
at some banks had the contagious effect of causing interbank rates to rise for all other banks18.
A first form of contagion test we explore is an individual bank’s vulnerability to hoarding of
liquidity by other banks. A second form of contagion inquiry is instead to look at the effect of
one bank’s hoarding of liquidity on other banks’ borrowing cost.
To assess the first form of contagion we run the following regression:
Spreadit = αs ∗OLiqit + βs ∗OLiqi−t + θs · Zt + ωsi + εsit (8)
where Spread is the (transaction-weighted) unsecured spread to policy rate paid on overnight
loans extended to bank i on day t (only unsecured market data are available by bank); OLiqit
is the overnight liquidity held by bank i; and OLiqi−t is the aggregate overnight liquidity held
by all banks other than bank i . The vector Zt is defined as in system (1). Descriptive statistics
of the main variables used in the analysis are in Table 8. The quantity variables (liquidity
and payment activity) are normalized due to large differences in size across banks, as before by
considering number of standard deviation changes from the mean, calculated over the first 12
months of the sample period.
To assess the second form of contagion we replace Spreadit by Spreadi−t. We estimate each
equation by 2SLS using Pit−1, and Pi−t−1 as instruments for OLiqit and OLiqi−t, where P is a
vector of payment activity measures (volume and value). We have four instrumental variables
for two endogenous variables. We report regressions where each α and β are conditioned on the
two break dummies as in system (1). The instrumental variables are interacted similarly.
The results of estimating equation (8) are reported in Table 10a. The dependent variable
is Spreadit in columns (1) and (2) and Spreadi−t in columns (3) and (4). The first form
of contagion is statistically significant and large in magnitude: A bank’s borrowing spread is
significantly altered by the aggregate liquidity of other banks, and is independent of the bank’s
own liquidity buffer. In terms of magnitude a one standard deviation increase in OLiqi−t is
associated with a 15.6 basis points decline in Spreadit pre-crisis and a 6 basis points increase
in Spreadit during the crisis (column 1). The effect is smaller if we dummy out the week of
18Such a contagion effect has been mentioned during the recent events. See for instance, Wall Street Journal
September 17th 2008: “Banks abruptly stopped lending to each other or charged exorbitantly high rates Tuesday,
threatening to spread the troubles of American International Group Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to
a broad range of financial institutions and the global economy.”
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the uncovered OMO but remains meaningful (column 2). In columns (3) and (4) we explore
the second form of contagion, that is, whether an individual bank’s hoarding of liquidity affects
the average borrowing cost faced by other banks. This form of contagion is not statistically
significant in either specification.
We investigate the two forms of contagion further by conditioning α and β on: (1) a dummy
for whether bank i reported a higher (lower) sub-prime loss to total assets ratio; (2) a dummy
for whether bank i is one of the top four participants in the inter-bank market in volume terms.
Table 10b reports the estimates conditioning on the loss dummy. Here the first form of
contagion remains significant irrespective of whether the bank is high risk or low risk. Inter-
estingly, during the crisis banks that have had a milder precautionary behavior (i.e., low-risk
banks) show greater vulnerability to other banks’ hoarding behavior (column 2). There is weak
evidence also for the second form of contagion. The relationship between Spreadi−t and OLiqit
is not statistically significant in column (3), but marginally significant and positive in column
(4). The fact that in column (4) the second form of contagion is larger when bank i is high-risk
further confirms our prior that the positive relationship between borrowing cost and aggregate
liquidity is being driven by the precautionary behavior of weaker banks.
In Table 10c we report the results conditioning on the size of the bank. In columns (1) and
(2) we find that small banks’s borrowing cost is significantly dependent on variations in their
own liquidity buffer while this is not the case for large banks. This is potentially consistent with
a thesis that large banks have a more stable funding base than small banks. We also find that
on average small banks are more vulnerable to other banks’ hoarding behavior than large banks.
Further in column (3) we find that the second form of contagion is dependent on bank size.
Indeed we find that a large bank hoarding liquidity significantly affects other banks’ average
borrowing cost while for small banks this effect is smaller and not significant statistically.
To summarize, our analysis shows significant contagion pre- and during crisis in the form
of an individual bank’s borrowing cost being determined by other banks’ hoarding behavior as
well as in the form of an individual bank’s hoarding behavior affecting other banks’ average
borrowing cost. The second form of contagion is significant conditional on the bank being a
large and significant player in the inter-bank market. Since the effects are present both pre- and
during crisis, the critical determinant of whether there is significant contagion or not is whether
there is a significant rise in bank liquidity hoardings. The latter was the case since inception of
the crisis.
7 Spillover Effect to the Real Economy
Having explored interbank contagion we now assess spillover effects from the money markets
to the real sector. To be precise, we investigate how banks adjusted their supply of credit to
households and the corporate sector with changing conditions in the interbank market.
We measure the transmission of a (temporary) disturbance in interbank markets on lend-
ing rates and volumes to households and private non-financial corporations (PNFC) using the
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following specification:
Rratedit = αrIratedt + βrIratedt ∗ crisist + γrXi ∗ crisist + δrcrisist + ωri + εrit ,
Rvolit = αvIratedt + βvIratedt ∗ crisist + γvXi ∗ crisist + δvcrisist + ωvi + εvit ,
Iratedt = αiLiqt + βiLiqt ∗ crisist + δicrisist + εit ,
Liqt = αlpvalt + βlpvolt + γlpvalt ∗ crisist + θlpvolt ∗ crisist + δicrisist + εlt ,
(9)
where Rratedit is a rate charged on loans extended to retail borrowers or firms by bank i in
month t (households or private non-financial corporations) in basis points deviation from policy
rate; Iratedt is the secured (GC) rate spread to policy rate in month t in basis points19; Rvolit
is the growth rate of the stock of loans extended to retail borrowers in month t relative to the
previous month; Xi is a vector that includes two measures of a bank soundness: (1) the sub-
prime losses over total assets disclosed in the period January 2007 to June 2008; (2) and its
retail over interbank deposits ratio reported in June 2007; crisist is a dummy variable taking
value one from August 2007 onwards; Liqt is the aggregate average daily overnight liquidity
(log(billion £)) held by UK settlement banks in month t; pvalt and pvolt is their average daily
payment value (billion £) and volume (/1000), respectively, both expressed in logarithm.
Each equation also includes quarter fixed effects; two separate dummies for the first and
last month of a quarter; and dummies for June, July and August 2007. June 2007 is dummied
out because of the uncovered OMO that occurred in the last week of June, and August 2007
accounts for the fact that the BoE interventions in the first month of the crisis were muted. The
regression is run on monthly data covering the top five lenders over the sample period January
2007 to May 2008 since from the sixth lender onwards, the volume lent to both households and
firms is negligible compared to the top five.
Table 11 reports various descriptive statistics of lending volumes and rates. Few patterns in
the data are relevant to point out. First, rates charged to households are on average about 90
basis points higher than rates charged to firms. Second, lending to firms has grown more than
three times faster than lending to households in the past two years. Third, large retail banks
and low loss banks tend overall to lend at better terms to households but also increased lending
by less post-August 2007. This suggests that institutions whose financial condition appears
sounder apply tighter lending criteria, i.e., take less risk, both pre- and during the crisis.
The estimation results are reported in Table 12. We find significant evidence in columns (1)
to (4) that lenders were prompt at passing increases in the interbank rate onto households and
PNFC. For instance, a one basis point rise in the secured interbank spread is associated with
1.3 basis points rise in the floating rate charged to household loans during the crisis. Floating
rates tend to be charged on secured mortgage lending and fixed rates on credit card overdrafts
and other consumer credit besides mortgages. The average effect on the fixed rates charged
on loans to PNFC is of comparable magnitude.20 Interestingly, before the crisis there is no
discernible relationship between the interbank spread and spreads charged on households and
PNFC lending. Also, overall the increase in rates observed during the crisis is larger for banks
which made larger losses. Retail banks increased their rates more; but they also offered much
lower rates pre-crisis so that they had more room for adjustment.
19We focus on the secured rate because it is the rate the BoE has the objective to keep close to the policy rate.
But the results are quite similar if the unsecured (Libor) rate is used instead.
20This finding is consistent with descriptive evidence in the BoE Credit Conditions Survey which reported in
2007 Q4 that lenders had revised upwards lending rates on secured credit to households and PNFC.
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Columns (5) and (6) suggest that the effect of an increase in the interbank rate on the
growth rate of lending to households and PNFC is significantly negative (at all times). On
average a 3 basis points increase in interbank rates is associated with a 0.153 percent decline
in the growth rate of lending to households. This represents about 10 per cent of a standard
deviation decline. The growth rate on lending to firms declines by more and only during the
crisis. A 3 basis points rise in interbank rates is associated with about a 0.44 per cent (24 per
cent of a standard deviation) decline in lending growth to PNFC. We conjecture that a part
of the sharper response of corporate borrowing to interbank rates may reflect the ability of
businesses, relative to households, to substitute away from bank funding toward market funding
when bank borrowing terms rise due to adverse condition of the banking sector.21
All in all, our findings point to the fact as lenders experienced tighter funding conditions
in the money market they almost immediately passed on the additional cost to households and
small businesses.
8 Related literature
Our paper cuts across a number of different strands of literature, in particular, on (i) reasons
why firms hoard cash, (ii) the function played by inter-bank markets and the reasons why
they may experience stress, (iii) the micro-structure of inter-bank markets in terms of reserves
requirements by central banks and the monetary policy, (iv) the transmission of inter-bank
market stress to the real economy and as contagion in the financial sector.
The fact that the onset of the sub-prime crisis led banks to hoard liquidity for precaution
against funding risk finds parallel in the corporate finance literature on financial constraints.
In this literature (see, for example, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004, and the references
therein), when firms cannot pledge a sufficient portion of their future cash flows in capital
markets, they attempt to hedge by managing cash. The result is reduced contemporaneous
investments. In addition, we also explore the transactional motive for liquidity since banks,
especially those in the payments system, settle a large volume of transactions on a daily basis
and when the volume becomes large or uncertain, they hold extra liquidity simply to be able to
effect these transactions. Indeed, we use the transactional component of cash as an instrument
to isolate the effect of the precautionary component.
The rationale for banks to hoard liquidity against aggregate shocks has also been modeled in
several papers. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that in the presence of aggregate liquidity
shocks asset sales cannot provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of markets.
Allen and Gale (2000) build a model of co-insurance against uncertain liquidity shocks through
bank cross-holdings. Coinsurance works well against idiosyncratic shocks: banks with surpluses
provide liquidity to banks with shortages. However the whole liquidity of the banking system is
21For instance, a document by the Association of Corporate Treasurers, (“Credit crisis corporates – funding and
beyond”, London, February 2009) argues that capital markets have been seen as replacement funding even for those
firms that have traditionally not made use of bonds. Some unrated firms sought their first rating in order to gain
access to new sources of funding. The BoE Trends in Lending, available at www.bankofenlgand.co.uk/statistics,
published in March 2009 reports that capital issuances were relatively high over the sample period consistent with
efforts by some businesses to diversify their funding sources. The BoE Credit Conditions Survey also reported
that while household demand for credit continued to rise until 2008 Q3, PNFC sought earlier to reduce their level
of debt and cut investment plans. These facts suggest that PNFC have a demand that is more elastic to changes
in spreads than households.
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bounded by the aggregate liquid assets in the banks’ portfolio. Hence while the cross-holdings
work perfectly in normal times and help reallocate liquidity across banks, they cannot create
additional liquidity. Diamond and Rajan (2001) develop a model where a bank failure can
spread to the whole system through a reduction in the common pool of available liquidity. In
Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009) liquidity hoarding by banks is driven by an increase in aggregate
uncertainty which causes banks to stop using the interbank market to trade with each other.
The banks hoard liquidity because they may need it to meet high aggregate demand.
The theory of inter-bank markets generally agrees on its role as being one of liquidity in-
surance and peer monitoring. The reasons why these markets may fail sometimes or experience
severe stress differ across studies. Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) and Freixas, Martin and
Skeie (2008) focus on incompleteness of contracting on liquidity shocks; Bhattacharyya and
Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), Bhattacharyya and Fulghieri (1994), Freixas and Jorge (2007),
and Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008) focus on asymmetric information and/or counter-
party risk and related inefficiencies; finally, Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) focus on
issues arising due to market power and strategic behavior of liquidity-surplus banks. While we
do not study bilateral inter-bank market data required to investigate strategic behavior, our
findings suggest that the stress in inter-markets witnessed during the sub-prime crisis is unlikely
to have been due (entirely) to counterparty risk concerns. We find almost identical effects in
the Sterling money markets for overnight lending in secured as well as unsecured transactions.
In this sense, our findings are more consistent with the inability of banks to hedge at least some
funding shocks, aggregate or idiosyncratic.
Our paper also relates to the small literature exploring the microstructure of inter-bank
markets. Hamilton (1997) studies the role of bank liquidity in affecting the federal funds rate
by employing as an instrument the “errors” in the Federal Reserve forecasts of the effect of its
operations on bank reserves. While we control for open market operations in our tests, we rely
on the extent of payments activity as an instrument. On this front, our approach is similar to
that of Furfine (2000) who calibrates a model as well as empirically demonstrates that daily fed
funds rate variability is linked to that of payment flows, and that higher payment flows lead
to greater precautionary reserves which put an upward pressure on the funds rate. We take a
step further in showing that payment flows are predictable and thus use payment flows as an
instrument to isolate the effect of that component of reserves on interest rates that arises as a
precaution against unobserved funding risk faced by banks in capital or inter-bank markets.
Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) also provide evidence consistent with precautionary targeting of
reserves balances maintained by banks at the Federal Reserve and the role played by “arbitrage”
activity of banks using their reserves in ensuring that overconcentration of reserves does not arise
in some banks. Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) hint at the possibility that precautionary targeting
of reserves by banks, anticipating the heightened risk of hoarding by other banks, can lead to
a “gridlock”, high interest rates and systemic risk, on days when some large institutions end
up with high reserves (by chance or by design). It is possible that precautionary hoardings we
identify capture such a phenomenon, but the fact that they increase in our data for weaker
banks leads us to conclude that they are potentially also a response to funding needs during
adverse conditions.22
22In contrast to the crisis of 2007-2009, Furfine (2002) finds that the inter-bank markets functioned remark-
ably well in transferring liquidity in the banking system during the Autumn of 1998 when Long Term Capital
Management’s problems surfaced.
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Our results on transmission of an individual bank’s funding risk, and its precautionary
hoardings, to other banks and to the real economy do not find a direct parallel in the literature.
Nevertheless, this form of contagion is similar in overall spirit to that considered in models of
aggregate liquidity shortages such as Freixas and Rochet (1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas,
Parigi and Rochet (2000), Diamond and Rajan (2005), and Acharya (2009) wherein banks are
reliant on a common pool of liquidity and one bank’s adversity reduces the available pool for
others due to fire sales of assets, deadweight losses from bad assets, or drawdowns of inter-bank
deposits. To the best of our knowledge, a theoretical model, wherein precautionary hoardings
of affected banks are explicitly modeled and shown to raise the cost of borrowing for healthier
banks giving rise to an interest-rate contagion, does not yet exist.
9 Conclusion
By examining the effect of a full-blown financial crisis (starting August 2007) on aggregate liq-
uidity of the banking sector, and its effect on interbank market rates, we uncovered an important
precautionary demand channel that caused stress in the Sterling money markets. The economics
underlying these effects suggest that the channel was likely to be at work in other countries too,
and thus contributed also to the global financial turmoil. Perhaps most interestingly, our results
showed that interbank rate volatility can induce volatility in rates to the real economy and also
produce a contagion-style systemic risk whereby increase in the precautionary demand for some
adversely affected banks leads to rise in borrowing costs for all other banks.
There are several important avenues for future work. Within the aggregate setting, the
substitution of liquidity demand between term (3-month) and overnight borrowing seems an
intriguing issue to investigate. Further, our study focused on identifying the precautionary
motive for liquidity. As such, by showing that effects of liquidity on interbank rates were similar
for both secured and unsecured lending, we ruled in favor of the precautionary motive as against
the counterparty risk in lending. An additional channel – the “strategic” one – may also be at
work. There are two aspects to this channel. One is the strategic behavior in terms of market
power of some large players in the interbank markets (e.g., Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer,
2008) and on specific days with substantial asymmetry of transaction uncertainty. This would
require bilateral analysis of interbank markets and relationships.
The second is the strategic behavior due to adversely affected banks not disclosing their losses
early enough and delaying asset sales (Diamond and Rajan, 2009), and safer banks hoarding
cash with the motive to acquire these assets at deep discounts in future (Acharya, Shin and
Yorulmazer, 2007 and Diamond and Rajan, 2009). It is our prior that this kind of strategic
effect was prevalent after the failure of Lehman Brothers when the returns on various kind of
assets and strategies rose sky-high and an overall freeze resulted in the global financial system.
This too remains a feasible exercise in a bilateral analysis of interbank markets.
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03-May: UBS closes distressed hedge fund
14-June: Bear Stearns quarterly earnings fall by a third
22-June: Bear Stearns injects 3.2 bn USD to bail out structured credit fund
25-June: Cheyne's Queenswalk fund announced 68 million USD loss
29-July: IKB announces 10 bn Euro exposure
09-August: BNP suspends calculation of the net asset value of three
money market funds exposed to sub-prime and halts redemption
13-August: Goldman Sachs injects 3 bn USD into its statistical arbitrage fund
after 30 % loss
17-August: Sachsen LB receives 17.3 bn Euro bail-out
14-September: Emergency lending facility to Northern Rock
01-05-October: Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and UBS announce large losses
05-October: Bank of England widens bands around reserves target from 1% to 30%
Mid-December to mid-February: Large loss announcements
by RBS, UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse
14-March:  Bear Stearns rescue







































28 June Open market operation
uncovered
09-August: BNP suspends calculation of the net asset value
of three money market funds and suspends redemption
13-August: Goldman Sachs injects 3 bn USD into its statistical
arbitrage fund after 30% loss
17-August: Sachsen LB is bailed out
14-September: Northern Rock receives emergency
lending facility
Mid-December to Mid-February: Large loss announcements
by UBS, RBS, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, Citigroup
14-March: Bear Stearns distress
Figure 2: Secured (solid line) and unsecured overnight spreads
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Figure 3: Aggregate Settlement Banks Reserves Target in billion £
























Figure 4: CHAPS payment activity value
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Figure 5: CHAPS payment activity volume













































Figure 6: Overnight liquidity and secured rate spread (in basis points)
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Figure 7: Overnight liquidity and 3 months Libor-OIS spread (bps)











































Figure 8: Overnight Liquidity and Secured Spread Post-Lehman
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Table 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Aggregate Liquidity and Payment Activity
Panel 1a- Whole Sample 376 Observations
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
ln( First Tier Banks Overnight liquidity billion £) 2.39 0.25 1.62 3.18 1.96 2.4 2.79
ln( First Tier Banks Total liquidity billion £) 4.12 0.13 3.82 4.36 3.91 4.15 4.3
ln(Payment volume/1000) 4.91 0.21 4.51 5.64 4.67 4.84 5.31
ln(Payment value billion £) 5.44 0.16 4.73 5.98 5.21 5.43 5.71
Panel 1b- Pre August 9th 2007 (1)
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
ln( First Tier Banks Overnight liquidity billion £) 2.23 0.2 1.62 3.18 1.86 2.25 2.48
ln( First Tier Banks Total liquidity billion £) 3.98 0.067 3.82 4.22 3.87 3.98 4.1
ln(Payment volume/1000) 4.91 0.22 4.51 5.64 4.66 4.84 5.28
ln(Payment value billion £) 5.38 0.15 4.73 5.91 5.17 5.38 5.64
Panel 1c- Post August 9th 2007 (2)
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
ln( First Tier Banks Overnight liquidity billion £) 2.5 0.22 1.89 2.96 2.1 2.51 2.82
ln( First Tier Banks Total liquidity billion £) 4.22 0.06 4.07 4.36 4.12 4.22 4.32
ln(Payment volume/1000) 4.91 0.2 4.57 5.6 4.69 4.84 5.33
ln(Payment value billion £) 5.47 0.16 4.83 5.98 5.27 5.47 5.72
Panel 1d- DIFFERENCE (2)-(1)
Variables Difference P-value
ln( First Tier Banks Overnight liquidity billion £) 0.27 0
ln( First Tier Banks Total liquidity billion £) 0.24 0
ln(Payment volume/1000) 0 0.67
ln(Payment value billion £) 0.09 0
The data are from the Bank of England and are daily for the period 02/01/07 to 30/06/08. First-tier banks are the 10 UK banks that settle their 
payments and customer payments directly at the central bank. The overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts balances measured at 5 
am each day. The total liquidity includes the overnight and the intraday liquidity. The intraday liquidity is the maximum collateralized intraday-credit 
that can be obtained from the central bank each day. Payment activity (value and volume) is the sum of all transactions that flow through CHAPS, 
the UK large-value payment system ( real-time-gross settlement system operated by the Bank of England). Both the aggregate value and the 
aggregate volume of payments are net of interbank loans activity.  
Table 2. Bai-Perron Multiple Level Break Tests on Liquidity Held by First-Tier Banks  
Panel 2a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Overnight Liquidity+Intraday Liquidity)
Break Dates 95 % Interval Estimates Key Market News Date
02/01/2007 3.937*** Sample Starts
(0.007) Early Phase
27/03/2007 [27/02/07;19/04/07] 4.009*** UBS to close Dillon Read hedge fund unit. The unit suffers large losses in US-sub prime 03 May 2007
(0.006) Bear stearns announces quarterly earnings fall by a third as trading revenues were impacted by  14 June 2007
08/08/2007 [30/07/07;09/08/07] 4.213*** problems in the US mortgage market. Fixed income sales and trading revenue fall by 21 per cent. 
(0.004) Bear Stearns provides 3.2 bn dollars financing to bail out structured credit fund 22 June 2007
Cheyne's Queenswalk fund announces 68 million dollars losses 25 June 2007
UDmax SupLRt(2/1) SupLRt(3/2) IKB announces surprise 10 billion € exposure to US sub-prime mortgages through it ABCP-funded vehicles 30 July 2007
234.469*** 23.425*** 8.535
Main Phase
BNP Paribas suspends the calculation of the net asset value of  three money market funds exposed to sub-prime 
and halts redemption 09 August 2007
Goldman Sachs injects $3bn ($2bn of its own capital) into its statistical arbitrage fund 13 August 2007
Sachsen LB receives a €17.3bn bailout by German state 17 August 2007
Bank of England announces emergency lending facility to Northern Rock 14 September 2007
Bank of England supplies additional reserves to the banking system +25% (one week maturity) 13 September 2007
UBS says it would make write downs of $3.4bn to its fixed income portfolio 01 October 2007
Citigroup says Q3 earnings will fall 60% on a year ago 01 October 2007
Merrill Lynch announces it will make a loss in Q3 due to a $5.5bn write-down 05 October 2007
Merrill Lynch reports write-downs of $7.9 bn on sub-prime mortgages and asset-backed securities 24 October 2007
Morgan Stanley announces a $3.7bn loss on sub-prime structured credit 08 November 2007
Rumours of a $10bn write-down by Barclays relating to securities backed by sub-prime mortgages 09 November 2007
Note: (***) stands for significant at the 1 per cent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Liquidity is measured as the sum of reserves accounts held at the central bank. 
The Bai and Perron (1998) sequential algorithm is used to estimate the timing of (lasting) level shifts in the liquidity series (overnight and total). This method applies 
an algorithm that searches all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the set that produces the maximum goodness-of-fit. The WD max is 
used to investigate if at least one break is present. If there is evidence for one break the method continues to add breaks until the supLRT(l+1/l) test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of no additional structural changes at the 5% level or there is no room for more breaks. We allow for heterogeneous and autocorrelated errors as outlined 
in Bai and Perron (2003). The trimming parameter is set to 15%. This implies a minimal window length of about 2 months. The test results are reported in this table 
together with a timeline of relevant events put together using Bloomberg. See Table 1 for a definition of the intraday and overnight liquidity.
Panel 2b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Overnight Liquidity)
Break Dates 95 % Interval Estimates Timeline of Events (continued)
02/01/2007 2.236*** Bank of America's CEO pre-announces writedowns of $3bn in Q4. 13 November 2007
(0.015) Bear Stearns announces an expected write down of $1.2bn in Q4 14 November 2007
11/09/2007 [23/08/07;18/09/07] 2.474*** Freddia Mac announces a Q3 loss of $2bn 20 November 2007
(0.017) UBS announces further write downs of $10bn (dated to end November) 10 December 2007
13/03/2008 [04/03/08;08/04/08] 2.629*** Bank of America announces it may have to record more than its initial $3.3 billion losses and write-downs 12 December 2007
(0.023) Citigroup announces it is to raise at least $14.5 billion in new capital 15 January 2008
Merrill Lynch reports $ 10.3 billion loss 17 January 2008
Ambac announces Q4 net loss of $3.225 billion 22 January 2008
XL capital Ltd expects Q4 net loss of up to $1.2 billion 23 January 2008
UDmax SupLRt(2/1) SupLRt(3/2) Credit Suisse announces additional $2.85 billion losses 19 February 2008
112.673*** 17.392*** 8.936 JP Morgan agrees to provide secured lending to Bear Stearns 14 March 2008
JP Morgan agrees to purchase Bear Stearns for $2 per share 16 March 2008
Fed gives primary dealers effective access to the discount window through a new credit facility 16 March 2008
HBOS equity price falls sharply on rumours of liquidity problems. HBOS denies any problem. 19 March 2008
Note: (***) stands for significant at the 1 per cent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Liquidity is measured as the sum of reserves accounts held at the central bank. 
Table 3. Calendar Effects on the Aggregate level of Payments Activity
OLS (1) OLS (2)
Calendar Dummies ln(Payments Value) ln(Payments Volume)
United Kingdom Holidays [-1;+1] 0.073* 0.115**
(0.039) (0.048)
United States Holidays [0] -0.575*** -0.146***
(0.032) (0.024)
First 5 days of the month 0.002 0.044**
(0.018) (0.018)










Quarter 1 0.081 0.044
(0.064) (0.052)
Quarter 2 0.035 -0.019
(0.06) (0.048)
Quarter 3 0.138 0.030
(0.107) (0.074)




Portmanteau Test for White Noise 0.29 0.12
at Lag-1 P-value 
R-squared 0.38 0.75
Number of Observ. 376 376
Note: The portmenteau test is run on the residuals from regressions that exclude the constant term.
Mondays are excluded i.e. the model for the test is in calendar time rather than in working days time.
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of a regression of the aggregate log payments value and volume on various calendar 
effects.  UK holidays is a dummy taking value one on days just preceeding and following bank holidays; US holidays take value on US holidays 
and so on so forth. "Quarter 1" takes value one on each day of the last week of the first quarter and so on so forth.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicates significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
The results indicate that up to 75 per cent of the variation in payments activity can be explained by few calendar dummies.
Table 4. Relationship Between First-Tier (Settlement) Banks Liquidity Holding and Payments Activity 
Before and During the Sub-Prime Crisis
ln(Overnight Liquidity) ln(Total Liquidity) ln(Overnight Liquidity) ln(Total Liquidity) ln(Overnight Liquidity) ln(Total Liquidity) 
SURE 1 SURE 1 SURE 2 SURE 2 SURE 3 SURE 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Payment value)(t) 0.405*** 0.388*** -0.03 0.108*** -0.039 0.124***
(0.079) (0.049) (0.085) (0.038) (0.087) (0.037)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break1 -0.071 -0.082*
(0.047) (0.046)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2 0.266** 0.203*
(0.121) (0.121)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3 -0.001 0.082
(0.19) (0.19)
ln(Payment volume)(t) -0.484*** -0.301*** -0.304*** -0.138*** -0.273*** -0.132***
(0.083) (0.051) (0.07) (0.03) (0.068) (0.028)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break1 0.046 0.042
(0.033) (0.032)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2 -0.071 -0.083
(0.093) (0.089)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3 0.086 0.05
(0.125) (0.121)












constant 2.743*** 3.505*** 4.118*** 4.11*** 4.027*** 4.002***
(0.4) (0.247) (0.415) (0.177) (0.421) (0.177)
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x x x
R-squared 0.24 0.17 0.58 0.81 0.13 0.62
Number Observ. 376 376 376 376 376 376
Note: (*), (**), (***) stand for significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Break1 is a dummy taking value one from 08/08/07 onwards; Break2 takes value one from 11/09/07 onwards; Break3 takes value one from 13/03/08 onwards. 
Uncovered OMO takes value one the last week of June 2007. Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards.
This table reports seemingly-unrelated-least-squares (SURE) estimates of the relationship between UK first-tier banks liquidity (overnight and total) and payment activity 
before and during the crisis. See Table 1 for a definition of the overnight and intraday liquidity and payment activity (value and volume). 
Table 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Bank level regressions variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Used in Table 6
Overnight liquidity (1) 0.1 1.065 -3.32 7.76 -1.18 -0.124 2.145
Total liquidity (1) 0.153 1.129 -3.32 12.28 -1.35 -0.028 2.09
Aggregate Payment Value (trillion £) 0.263 0.038 0.133 0.425 0.210 0.259 0.335
Aggregate Payment Volume (million) 0.139 0.032 0.091 0.281 0.107 0.127 0.203
Retail Deposits/Interbank Deposits (2) 7.13 5.27 1.39 17 1.39 5.93 17
Sub-prime Losses/Total Assets (3) 0.0009 0.0015 0 0.005 0 0 0.005
Equity Price (4) 0.058 4.66 -11.25 11.7 -6.6 0.038 10.13
Used in Table 10
Own Unsecured Spread to policy rate 
(Bps) 4.428 11.208 -210 201 -5 3.286 17.424
Counterparties Unsecured Spread to 
policy rate (Bps) 6.076 9.938 -15.616 94.743 -1.342 4.419 18.082
Own Bank Liquidity (5) -2.41E-11 0.999 -3.553 6.486 -1.22 -0.205 1.897
Counterparties Liquidity (5) 5.88E-08 0.999 -6.999 3.571 -1.585 0.154 1.147
(1) Normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. 
(2) Values reported in June 2007 interim reports 
(3) Losses reported from June 2007 to March 2008
(4) Normalized by subtracting the 2006 mean and dividing by the 2006 standard deviation. The source is Bloomberg. 
(5) Normalized by subtracting the bank (group) specific sample mean and dividing by the bank (group) specific standard deviation calculated over the first 12 sample months.
See Table 1 for a definition of the overnight liquidity, the intraday liquidity and the payment activity. 
Table 6. Evidence on First-Tier UK Banks' Precautionary Liquidity Reaction during the Sub-Prime Crisis
This table reports seemigly-unrelated-least-squares estimates of two versions of system (7). The first version in Panel 6a is 
similar to the one in the text and explains an individual bank demand for liquidity as a function of the aggregate level of 
payment activity, allowing for a shift in this relationship during the crisis. The second version in Panel 6b also allows the 
precautionary liquidity reaction of banks to aggregate payment shocks to differ between risky and non-risky banks. 
calendar is a vector of calendar effects (maintenance days and open market operations days). We use two measures of bank 
risk: (1) the ratio of retail deposits/interbank deposits reported in June 2007 interim reports; (2) the sub-prime losses/total 
assets ratio, where losses include write-downs and are those reported in the period from June 2007 to June 2008. We also 
use the variation in the bank equity price relative to 2006. The deviation in equity price from 2006 is obtained by subtracting 
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both measured on 2006 data. Robust standard errors clustered by banks are 
reported in parentheses. Bank liquidity is normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation 
calculated over the first 12 sample months.  (*), (**), (***) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 
per cent level, respectively. The regressions are run on individual banks data covering all first-tier UK banks. Here we only 
report the results for the overnight liquidity as it is our main focus. 
Panel 6a. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Payment value)(t) 0.222 0.219 0.228 0.231 0.227 -0.831
(0.894) (0.887) (0.892) (0.881) (0.888) (1.045)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2 1.753 1.754 1.764 1.804* 1.775 1.900
(1.121) (1.110) (1.118) (1.096) (1.110) (1.334)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3 2.025* 2.030* 1.995* 1.929* 1.981* 2.585*
(1.155) (1.141) (1.152) (1.112) (1.138) (1.493)
ln(Payment volume)(t) -2.721*** -2.721*** -2.719*** -2.715*** -2.718*** -0.859
(1.011) (1.004) (1.008) (0.999) (1.005) (1.177)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2 -1.539 -1.536 -1.558 -1.598 -1.566 -1.285
(1.192) (1.180) (1.188) (1.164) (1.180) (1.423)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3 -0.182 -0.189 -0.148 -0.072 -0.131 -0.583
(1.294) (1.278) (1.290) (1.245) (1.274) (1.662)
(SubPrime losses/TotalAssets)(i)Break2 115.654***
(20.191)






(Pre Crisis Retail/Interbank deposits 
ratio)(i)Break2*LowLoss -0.012*
(0.006)
(Pre Crisis Retail/Interbank deposits 
ratio)(i)Break2*HighLoss 0.037**
(0.016)
(Sub-Prime losses/Total assets)(i)*Break3 4.737
(19.811)






(Pre Crisis Retail/Interbank deposits 
ratio)(i)Break3*LowLoss -0.004
(0.006)
(Pre Crisis Retail/Interbank deposits 
ratio)(i)Break3*HighLoss 0.0004
(0.016)
Equity Price deviation from 2006 (it) 0.089***
(0.014)
Equity Price deviation from 2006 (it)*Break2 -0.078***
(0.011)
Equity Price deviation from 2006 (it)*Break3 -0.001
(0.008)
Break1 0.159** 0.159** 0.161** 0.165** 0.162** 0.260***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.085)
Break2 0.004 -0.101 0.120 -0.167 -0.001 0.108
(0.279) (0.277) (0.282) (0.274) (0.282) (0.332)
Break3 -0.454* -0.458* -0.419 -0.463* -0.430* -0.538
(0.263) (0.260) (0.265) (0.254) (0.264) (0.341)
Uncovered OMO -0.237 -0.237 -0.238 -0.238 -0.238 -0.154
(0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) (0.203)
Band-Widening -0.099 -0.099 -0.095 -0.087 -0.094 -0.134
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.085)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 0.061 0.060 0.066 0.078 0.069 -0.013
(0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.121)
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
Bank + Maintenance days effects x x x x x x
OMO days fixed effects x x x x x x
Number Observ. 3780 3780 3780 3780 3780 3780
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. Uncovered OMO takes value one the last week 
of June  2007.  Break1 takes value one from 08/08/07 onwards; Break2 takes value one post 11/09/07 ; and Break3 takes value one post 13/03/2008.
Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards.
Column (4)  LowRetail takes value one if a bank reports a lower than median retail over interbank deposits ratio in June 2007 and inversely for HighRetail.
Column (5) HighLoss  takes value one if a bank disclosed higher than median losses as a fraction of total assets and inversely for LowLoss
Panel 6b
Risk=Loss Risk=Retail Risk=Equity Price
(1) (2) (4)
ln(Payment value)(t)*HighRisk -1.191 0.597 0.362
(1.162) (1.016) (1.495)
ln(Payment value)(t)*LowRisk 1.167 -0.324 0.183
(1.021) (1.157) (0.935)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2*HighRisk 3.645*** 1.409 3.208**
(1.345) (1.209) (1.648)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2*LowRisk 0.192 2.388* 1.359
(1.225) (1.327) (1.154)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3*HighRisk 1.367 1.379 1.670
(1.410) (1.369) (1.757)
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3*LowRisk 2.455* 2.311* 2.167*
(1.274) (1.237) (1.202)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*HighRisk 0.205 -0.384 -1.457
(1.391) (1.387) (1.846)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*LowRisk -4.671*** -4.271*** -3.040***
(1.194) (1.191) (1.072)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2*HighRisk -3.837** -2.823 -1.463
(1.841) (1.815) (2.574)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2*LowRisk -0.013 -0.772 -1.526
(1.514) (1.492) (1.315)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3*HighRisk 1.409 1.733 0.410
(2.018) (1.960) (2.845)
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3*LowRisk -1.234 -1.292 -0.392
(1.655) (1.607) (1.441)
Break1 0.159 0.165** 0.156**
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Break2 0.003 -0.017 0.013
(0.279) (0.275) (0.277)
Break3 -0.454* -0.452* -0.455*
(0.263) (0.255) (0.263)
Uncovered OMO -0.237 -0.238 -0.237
(0.175) (0.176) (0.174)
Band-Widening -0.098 -0.089 -0.104
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 0.062 0.077 0.053
(0.094) (0.093) (0.094)
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.10
Bank fixed effect x x x
Maintenance days effects x x x
OMO days effects x x x
Number Observ. 3780 3780 3780
Column (1) HighRisk takes value one if a bank disclosed higher than median losses as a fraction of total assets and inversely for LowRisk.
Column (2) HigRisk takes value one if a bank reported a lower than median retail deposit ratio and inversely for LowRisk. 
Column (3) HighRisk takes value one if a bank has had lower than average equity price deviations and inversely for LowRisk. 
Table 7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Money Markets Rates and Volumes
Panel 7a- Whole Sample 376 Observations
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Secured overnight rate 5.47 0.31 5.03 6.66 5.06 5.47 5.89
Unsecured overnight rate 5.52 0.32 5.04 6.75 5.08 5.52 5.94
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Basis points) 6.25 12.65 -14.17 108.33 -3.88 4.5 17.5
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Bps) 11.47 13.31 -9.37 125.38 3.98 9.38 29.22
ln(Secured overnight volume billion £) 1.77 0.44 0.19 2.77 1.03 1.76 2.46
ln(Unsecured overnight volume billion £) 3.12 0.16 2.58 3.59 2.85 3.12 3.39
3 Months secured rate to overnight index swap spread (Bps) -1.32 3.45 -19.9 9.87 -5.03 -1.63 5.28
3 Months unsecured rate to overnight index swap spread 
(Bps) 46.09 34.58 -7.34 113.65 8.66 45.13 100.66
ln(unsecured 3 Months volume million £) 5.799 0.785 2.398 7.644 4.372 5.823 6.972
Panel 7b- Pre August 9th 2007 (1)
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Secured overnight rate 5.43 0.27 5.03 6.58 5.11 5.3 5.83
Unsecured overnight rate 5.5 0.27 5.06 6.75 5.16 5.36 5.85
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Basis points) 4.82 14.78 -13 108.33 -5 3 9.72
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Bps) 11.86 15.84 -7.75 125.38 5.63 10 15.46
ln(Secured overnight volume billion £) 1.5 0.39 0.2 2.3 0.82 1.54 2.16
ln(Unsecured overnight volume billion £) 3.04 0.16 2.58 3.59 2.79 3.05 3.34
3-months secured rate to overnight index swap spread (Bps) -4.17 1.74 -19.9 3.87 -5.36 -4.12 -2.42
3-months unsecured rate to overnight index swap spread 
(Bps) 10 2.41 -7.34 19.88 7.62 9.78 13.33
ln(unsecured 3 Months volume million £) 5.703 0.792 2.398 7.313 4.258 5.73 6.849
Interest rates and volume data are from the British Bankers'Association and the Wholesale Markets Brokers' Association. The 3-month unsecured 
volume is from the Bank of England; derived using an algorithm similar to Furfine (1998) adjusted to account for an interest payment larger than 
overnight loans. The secured rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate both for overnight and 3-month. The unsecured overnight rate is the Sterling 
Overnight Index Average (SONIA) rate for overnight and the Libor for 3 month. 
Panel 7c- Post August 9th 2007 (2)
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Secured overnight rate 5.49 0.33 5.03 6.67 5.06 5.53 5.99
Unsecured overnight rate 5.55 0.35 5.04 6.5 5.08 5.55 6.1
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Basis points) 7.23 10.89 -14.17 91.67 -2.93 5.97 23.67
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Bps) 11.2 11.29 -9.37 75 1.75 8.63 35.55
ln(Secured overnight volume billion £) 1.95 0.37 0.94 2.77 1.37 1.96 2.58
ln(Unsecured overnight volume billion £) 3.17 0.14 2.84 3.55 2.94 3.17 3.4
3 Months secured rate to overnight index swap spread (Bps) 0.64 2.92 -12.83 9.87 -2.67 0 6.99
3 Months unsecured rate to overnight index swap spread 
(Bps) 70.97 22.27 25.04 113.65 36.43 73.04 106.24
ln(unsecured 3 Months volume million £) 5.89 0.769 2.833 7.644 4.543 5.914 7.084
Panel 7d- DIFFERENCE (2)-(1)
Variables Difference P-value
Secured overnight rate 0.06 0.004
Unsecured overnight rate 0.05 0.13
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Basis points) 2.41 0.045
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate (Bps) -0.66 0.61
ln(Secured overnight volume billion £) 0.45 0
ln(Unsecured overnight volume billion £) 0.13 0
3 Months secured rate to overnight index swap spread (Bps) 4.81 0
3 Months unsecured rate to overnight index swap spread 
(Bps) 60.97 0
ln(unsecured 3 Months volume million £) 0.187 0.004
Table 8. The Impact of First-Tier Banks Precautionary Liquidity Hoarding on Overnight Money Markets 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Overnight liquidity) -20.624*** -18.020*** -0.128 0.138*
(5.351) (5.898) (0.194) (0.073)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break2 22.685*** 24.137*** -0.282 -0.092
(7.046) (7.766) (0.256) (0.096)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break3 -13.563 -7.900 -0.174 0.0015
(10.6) (11.682) (0.385) (0.144)
Break2 -68.350*** -78.278*** 0.813 0.174
(18.673) (20.581) (0.678) (0.254)
Break3 36.161 21.968 0.777 0.025
(28.963) (31.922) (1.051) (0.393)
Break1 14.872*** 15.767*** 0.277*** 0.230***
(2.391) (2.635) (0.087) (0.032)
Band-Widening -2.375 -0.399 0.044 -0.071**
(2.661) (2.933) (0.097) (0.036)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 2.791 -1.251 0.081 -0.165***
(3.243) (3.574) (0.118) (0.044)
constant 52.343*** 50.535*** 1.790*** 2.67***
(14.794) (16.306) (0.537) (0.201)
Maintenance days effects x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x
Number Observ. 295 295 295 295
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  (*), (**), (***) stand for significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Break1 is a dummy taking value one from August 9th 2007 onwards
Break2 is a dummy taking value one from September 12th 2007 onwards
Break3  is a dummy taking value one from March 13th 2008 onwards
Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards.
We report semingly-unrelated-least squares and three-stage-least-squares (3SLS). 3SLS combines 2SLS and SURE. All 
spreads are in basis points. The Hansen-Sargan overidentification test is reported. It tests the null hypothesis that the excluded 
instruments are valid instruments, i.e, uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equations. The 
model is in calendar days time rather than in working days time i.e. Mondays are excluded to avoid the distortion from Friday 
being both a particularly high payments activity day and the day after the regular weekly open market operation (omo). In other 
words, the model in calendar days time is preferred because the model in working days time is not well identified; payments 
activity on day t-1 is a weak instrument for overnight liquidity holding at day t. 
Panel 8b: Three-Stage-Least-Squares: Second Stage Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Overnight liquidity) -64.546** -40.128** -66.002** -43.608** -63.878** -39.7* -65.685** -43.368*
(25.747) (20.356) (28.503) (22.228) (27.707) (22.418) (30.602) (24.94)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break2 78.528*** 46.074** 77.661*** 44.691** 70.017*** 36.085* 68.543** 33.656
(25.298) (19.819) (25.715) (19.92) (27.223) (21.826) (27.609) (22.351)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break3 -28.411 -31.409 -0.717 -2.701 4.585 1.217 10.414 8.763
(41.461) (29.719) (45.402) (32.449) (44.618) (32.728) (48.746) (36.409)
Break2 -207.75*** -127.777*** -203.743*** -120.451** -189.48*** -105.595** -183.541** -94.897*
(63.542) (49.372) (67.937) (51.579) (63.379) (54.371) (72.941) (57.873)
Break3 78.161 87.439 -0.988 5.832 -12.746 -2.231 -28.813 -22.701
(112.534) (80.695) (123.54) (88.311) (121.165) (88.866) (132.64) (99.088)
Break1 15.303*** 16.708*** 15.27*** 16.664*** 16.124*** 17.662*** 16.114*** 17.63***
(2.718) (1.949) (2.743) (1.961) (2.925) (2.147) (2.948) (2.2)
Uncovered OMO 62.382*** 62.02*** 67.706*** 67.068***
(7.081) (7.311) (7.798) (8.203)
Band-Widening -1.631 -3.423 -1.97 -4.131
(6.453) (4.53) (6.928) (5.084)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 4.742 3.036 -0.969 -2.932
(5.179) (3.653) (5.56) (4.099)
constant 159.183* 98.987** 162.994** 108.024** 162.931** 103.354* 167.677** 112.971*
(64.267) (50.718) (71.572) (55.673) (69.16) (55.854) (76.844) (62.469)
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification 
statistic= 22.774  22.909 17.131 17.109 22.774  22.909 17.131 17.109
P-value= 0.2 0.194 0.51 0.52 0.2 0.194 0.51 0.52
Number Observ. 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295
Note: (*), (**), (***) stand for significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. See Panel 6a for the definition of the Breaks. 
Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards.
Uncovered OMO takes value one in the last week of June 2007
Overnight GC-policy rate spread Overnight Sonia-policy rate spread
Panel 8b. (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Overnight liquidity) 0.411 0.373 0.517 0.483 0.343 0.432 0.307 0.406
(0.98) (1.078) (1.043) (1.135) (0.385) (0.418) (0.385) (0.416)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break2 0.799 0.816 0.643 0.644 0.381 0.268 0.34 0.223
(0.963) (1.049) (0.941) (1.017) (0.378) (0.407) (0.348) (0.373)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break3 -3.495** -3.498** -3.413** -3.402** 0.383 0.373 -0.023 -0.037
(1.578) (1.573) (1.661) (1.656) (0.619) (0.61) (0.614) (0.608)
Break2 -2.073 -2.112 -2.042 -2.034 -1.168 -0.889 -1.079 -0.791
(2.418) (2.614) (2.486) (2.633) (0.949) (1.014) (0.919) (0.966)
Break3 9.688** 9.698** 9.523** 9.496** -1.161 -1.131 0.029 0.068
(4.284) (4.272) (4.52) (4.508) (1.682) (1.657) (1.67) (1.654)
Break1 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.232*** 0.237***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.1) (0.1) (0.041) (0.04) (0.037) (0.037)
Uncovered OMO 0.011 0.032 0.211 0.2
(0.375) (0.373) (0.145) (0.137)
Band-Widening 0.404* 0.397* 0.031 0.028
(0.236) (0.231) (0.087) (0.085)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 0.292 0.288 -0.089 -0.093
(0.189) (0.186) (0.07) (0.068)
constant 0.377 0.472 0.093 0.18 2.124** 1.905* 2.216** 1.972*
(2.445) (2.685) (2.619) (2.842) (0.96) (1.041) (0.968) (1.043)
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification 
statistic= 22.774  22.909 17.131 17.109 22.774  22.909 17.131 17.109
P-value= 0.2 0.194 0.51 0.52 0.2 0.194 0.51 0.52
Number Observ. 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295
Note: see Panel 8a and 8b for variables definitions.
ln(Overnight Secured Volume) ln(Overnight Unsecured Volume)
Panel 8b. (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Payment value)(t-1) 0.132 0.162* 0.138* 0.162**
(0.089) (0.087) (0.086) (0.084)
ln(Payment value)(t-1)*Break2 0.143 0.126 0.068 0.055
(0.127) (0.122) (0.119) (0.114)
ln(Payment value)(t-1)*Break3 -0.009 0.012 0.169 0.182
(0.252) (0.249) (0.248) (0.244)
ln(Payment volume)(t-1) -0.310** -0.295*** -0.305** -0.282**
(0.129) (0.129) (0.124) (0.125)
ln(Payment volume)(t-1)*Break2 -0.053 -0.107 -0.055 -0.107
(0.176) (0.175) (0.173) (0.171)
ln(Payment volume)(t-1)*Break3 0.277 0.235 0.137 0.106
(0.236) (0.23) (0.233) (0.227)
Break2 -0.317 0.04 0.249 0.572
(0.694) (0.67) (0.688) (0.667)
Break3 -1.165 -1.08 -1.501 -1.417
(0.934) (0.907) (0.985) (0.952)
Break1 -0.011 -0.021 -0.014 -0.023
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)






constant 3.273*** 3.046*** 3.225*** 2.991***
(0.515) (0.5) (0.498) (0.481)
Maintenance days effects x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x
Number Observ. 295 295 295 295
Note: see Panel 8a and 8b for variables definitions.
ln(Overnight Liquidity) 
Table 9. The Impact of First-Tier Banks Precautionary Liquidity Hoarding on Term Money Markets 
3 month GC-OIS 
spread
3 month Libor-OIS 
spread
3 month Unsecured 
volume (a)




3 month Unsecured 
volume (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Overnight liquidity) -5.893 -40.110 0.296 -14.228 -93.366 0.537
(6.122) (45.725) (2.702) (10.397) (80.085) (3.345)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break2 2.468 17.395 2.361 37.295* 258.730* -6.317
(5.487) (40.978) (2.079) (20.048) (154.425) (6.450)
ln(Overnight liquidity)*Break3 -2.163 36.219 5.460 -31.769 -34.338 17.107
(8.938) (66.751) (8.231) (54762) (421.811) (17.617)
Break2 -4.151 -30.494 -6.627 -93.779* -647.987* 16.537
(14.207) (106.103) (5.589) (51.056) (393.268) (16.425)
Break3 6.253 -67.600 -14.768 82.629 129.336 -43.106
(24.325) (181.665) (22.796) (139.16) (1071.896) (44.769)
Break1 4.993*** 59.437*** 0.130 4.636*** 57.347*** 0.139
(0.54) (4.034) (0.208) (0.625) (4.813) (0.201)
Uncovered OMO -3.697* -10.707 -0.029 -2.909 -0.348 0.018
(2.014) (15.039) (0.804) (1.428) (11.000) (0.459)
Band-Widening -3.000** -16.653* 0.493 -2.909*** -21.526*** -0.037
(1.248) (9.32) (0.772) (0.889) (6.846) (0.286)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling 2.926*** -23.539***
(1.006) (7.515)
constant 10.898 109.364 5.272 33.100 252.352 4.610
(15.335) (114.528) (6.801) (26.399) (203.338) (8.493)
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x
OMO days effects x x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan 
Overidentification statistic= 17.109 3.318 6.72
P-value= 0.52 0.35 0.94
Number Observ. 295 295 245 245 245 245
Note: see notes in Table 8.  
(a) Data available until March 31st 2008.
The outcome variables are the secured and unsecured 3 months rate to OIS spread. In columns (4) to (6) we use the moving average 
ln(overnight liquidity) over a 20 working days windows. In columns (3)-(6) we add the 3-months unsecured volume as an endogeneous 
variable with data available only for the period  02/01/07 to 31/03/2008.
Table 10. Bank Level Evidence of Contagion in the Unsecured Money Market 
Panel 10a
               
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Overnight liquidity 6.854 -0.434 4.434 -1.728
(5.781) (4.718) (4.190) (3.179)
Own Overnight liquidity*Break2 8.065 14.036 5.485 10.090*
(10.715) (8.735) (7.555) (5.733)
Own Overnight liquidity*Break3 -21.369 -18.954 -12.701 -14.618*
(15.299) (12.496) (10.587) (8.073)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity -15.561*** -6.969* -15.464*** -5.927**
(4.594) (4.174) (3.560) (3.020)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break2 9.910* -1.248 10.716*** -1.472
(5.252) (4.578) (4.100) (3.301)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break3 9.747 13.065** 9.053* 13.672***
(6.477) (5.226) (5.559) (4.197)
Break2 -14.646*** -12.099*** -12.908*** -10.880***
(4.535) (3.620) (2.281) (2.462)
Break3 5.031 5.648 6.715 9.332**
(6.118) (4.994) (4.819) (3.693)
Break1 10.999*** 12.055*** 11.101*** 13.421***
(1.220) (0.995) (0.916) (0.704)
Uncovered OMO 48.914*** 55.471***
(3.612) (2.621)
Band-Widening 2.723 0.372 0.856 -1.757
(3.212) (2.575) (2.173) (1.628)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling -4.282 -8.283 -7.810 -13.856***
(6.723) (5.670) (5.623) (4.285)
Maintenance days effects and OMO days effects x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification statistic= 14.63 16.38 7.76 14.67
P-value= 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.02
Number Observ. 3145 3145 3444 3444
Note: (*), (**), (***) stand for significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. Robsut clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards.
Uncovered OMO takes value one in the last week of June 2007.
The CHAPS rate is calculated from the interbank loansdatabase extracted from the Bank of England payments database using the Furfine algorithm. 
See panel 8a for the definition of the breaks. 
Own borrowing spread Counterparties borrowing spread
Two-stage-least-squares estimates are reported. The interaction term HighLoss (Lowloss) is a dummy taking value 1 if the bank 
disclosed a higher (lower) than median sub-prime loss to total assets ratio in the period June 2007 to March 2008. See Table 5 for 
a definition of the liquidity variables. 
Panel 10b: Contagion conditional on bank risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Overnight liquidity*HighLoss 1.718 -2.626 0.395 -4.540
(4.650) (4.062) (4.250) (3.522)
Own Overnight liquidity*HighLoss*Break2 -4.532 2.427 5.401 12.673*
(10.079) (8.833) (9.181) (7.640)
Own Overnight liquidity*HighLoss*Break3 11.240 10.567 1.360 1.435
(9.881) (8.686) (9.039) (7.554)
Own Overnight liquidity*LowLoss -1.226 -9.524* 2.376 -6.084
(5.573) (4.888) (5.192) (4.321)
Own Overnight liquidity*LowLoss*Break2 11.919 17.850** 5.425 9.578*
(7.983) (7.005) (6.507) (5.409)
Own Overnight liquidity*LowLoss*Break3 -16.953** -14.493* -9.968 -7.665
(8.609) (7.576) (7.008) (5.873)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*HighLoss -13.091*** -7.425** -11.285*** -5.174*
(3.566) (3.332) (3.257) (2.884)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break2*HighLoss 11.677*** 2.782 7.799* -1.813
(4.559) (4.142) (4.179) (3.588)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break3*HighLoss 1.432 6.016 7.857* 13.151***
(5.009) (4.346) (4.709) (3.881)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*LowLoss -18.474*** -4.840 -20.896*** -6.537
(6.624) (6.242) (5.863) (5.220)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break2*LowLoss 9.749 -5.016 15.492*** -0.540
(6.887) (6.300) (5.846) (5.061)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break3*LowLoss 11.350** 12.902*** 7.091 9.613**
(5.359) (4.675) (4.941) (4.095)
Break2 -8.317** -6.662** -11.511*** -9.980***
(3.702) (3.198) (3.315) (2.735)
Break3 0.925 1.647 3.904 5.194*
(3.418) (3.009) (3.216) (2.700)
Break1 10.756*** 11.562*** 12.009*** 13.522***
(1.018) (0.896) (0.828) (0.696)
Uncovered OMO 47.771*** 54.702***
(3.084) (2.588)
Band-Widening -2.042 -3.424 -0.224 -2.139
(2.622) (2.276) (2.255) (1.857)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling -5.231 -8.423** -6.642 -11.124***
(4.543) (3.968) (4.159) (3.457)
Maintenance days effects and OMO days effects x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification statistic= 12.73 10.13 11.55 12.41
P-value= 0.39 0.60 0.48 0.41
Number Observ. 3145 3145 3444 3444
Note: see Panel 10a. HighLoss takes value one if a bank reported higher than median losses as a ratio of total assets (zero otherwise) 
and inversely for LowLoss.
Own borrowing spread Counterparties borrowing spread
Panel 10c: Contagion by large versus small banks
In this table we condition the contagion effect on the size of the bank i.e. whether or not it is one of the top 4 playersin the market
in terms of volume. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own Overnight liquidity*Big -5.635 -2.394 -7.115** -3.442*
(3.623) (2.937) (3.233) (2.118)
Own Overnight liquidity*Big*Break2 13.687 5.459 18.323** 8.902*
(9.263) (7.456) (8.166) (5.307)
Own Overnight liquidity*Big*Break3 -2.082 3.389 -3.945 2.127
(8.846) (6.831) (7.523) (4.794)
Own Overnight liquidity*Small 1.648 -3.858 2.474 -3.771*
(3.421) (2.737) (3.101) (1.991)
Own Overnight liquidity*Small*Break2 6.573 10.179** 2.954 5.866*
(6.038) (4.792) (4.945) (3.153)
Own Overnight liquidity*Small*Break3 -15.221* -13.711* -5.851 -4.534
(9.284) (7.386) (6.642) (4.264)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Big -9.260*** -5.566** -8.679*** -4.662**
(3.401) (2.813) (3.060) (2.042)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break2*Big 8.516** 3.092 8.214** 2.231
(4.145) (3.356) (3.662) (2.390)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break3*Big 1.521 2.067 1.441 2.272
(3.875) (3.073) (3.464) (2.213)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Small -17.470*** -5.618 -17.731*** -4.912
(5.162) (4.545) (4.371) (3.107)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break2*Small 13.840** -0.210 16.826*** 1.458
(5.522) (4.664) (4.613) (3.122)
Counterparties Overnight liquidity*Break3*Small 7.399 9.671** 2.640 5.543**
(4.896) (3.850) (4.317) (2.734)
Break2 -13.194*** -10.713*** -15.401*** -12.922***
(3.929) (3.065) (3.452) (2.177)
Break3 3.467 2.782 3.004 2.645
(3.383) (2.681) (2.935) (1.878)
Break1 10.897*** 11.970*** 11.958*** 13.574***
(0.940) (0.750) (0.791) (0.511)
Uncovered OMO 49.063*** 55.640***
(2.904) (2.019)
Band-Widening 2.190 -0.869 3.080 -0.483
(2.768) (2.159) (2.329) (1.461)
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling -3.416 -6.299* -1.040 -4.857**
(4.151) (3.286) (3.547) (2.264)
Maintenance days effects and OMO days effects x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification statistic= 10.34 14.87 12.37 44.61
P-value= 0.59 0.25 0.41 0.00
Number Observ. 3145 3145 3444 3444
Note: see Panel 10a. Big (Small)  is a dummy that takes value 1 if the bank is one (is not one) of the top 4 participants in the market by volume. 
Own borrowing spread Counterparties borrowing spread
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics Lending to Private Sector: Interest Rates and Volume Growth Rates 
Whole Sample 
85 Observations
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Floating rate on new loans to households (1) 68.541 36.754 9 169 14.5 57 141.7
Floating rate on new loans to private 
corporations (1) 160.835 48.793 48 383 65 164 228.4
Fixed rate on new loans to households (1) 152.141 106.94 -117 350 -12.6 133 318.7
Fixed rate on new loans to private corporations 
(1) 147.624 48.914 68.999 325 72.9 144 228.7
Growth rate of lending to households % (2) 0.392 1.156 -5.375 2.404 -0.952 0.513 1.962
Growth rate of lending to private corporations 
% (2) 1.252 1.767 -5.379 6.238 -1.138 1.242 3.845
Note: 
(1) Spread to policy rate in basis points
(2) Growth rate relative to previous month 
DIFFERENCE (Post August 2007)-(Pre August 2007)
Variables Difference  P-value
Floating rate on new loans to households (1) 14.37 0
Floating rate on new loans to private 
corporations (1) 2.39 0.77
Fixed rate on new loans to households (1) 83.35 0
Fixed rate on new loans to private corporations 
(1) 142.97 0.33
Growth rate of lending to households % (2) 0.528 0.02
Growth rate of lending to private corporations 
% (2) 0.728 0.08
(1) Spread to policy rate in basis points
(2) Growth rate relative to previous month 
All data (rates and volumes) are from the Bank of England statistics department. The data are monthly for the period January 2007-May 2008 and cover the top 5 lenders.  
Difference Tables by Risk Factor For Rates
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value) Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value)
High Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio 47.857 62.733 14.876 138.952 155.5 16.548
(0.01) (0.13)
Low Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio 78.429 92.05 13.621 190.143 171.3 -18.843
(0.05) (0.04)
High Loss/Total Assets Ratio 71.048 95.733 24.685 170.429 174.167 3.738
(0) (0.66)
Low Loss/Total Assets Ratio 43.643 42.55 -1.093 142.929 143.3 0.371
(0.78) (0.98)
Note: High means higher than or equal to median and Low lower than median 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value) Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value)
High Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio 50.571 170.800 120.23 131.428 151.095 19.67
(0) (0.01)
Low Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio 181.928 209.950 28.02 160.286 130.786 -29.50
(0.17) (0.01)
High Loss/Total Assets Ratio 115.952 202.533 86.58 162.433 149.467 -12.97
(0) (0.09)
Low Loss/Total Assets Ratio 83.857 162.350 78.49 133.550 153.00 19.45
(0) (0.26)
Note: High means higher than or equal to median and Low lower than median 
Household Floating rate Private Corporations Floating rate
Household Fixed rate Private Corporations Fixed rate
Difference Tables by Risk Factor For Growth of Lending Volumes
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value) Pre August 9th Post August 9th
Difference (2)-(1) =0 
(Test P-value)
High Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio -0.003 0.257 0.26 0.909 1.641 0.732
(0.48) (0.28)
Low Retail/Interbank deposit Ratio 0.16 1.091 0.931 0.629 1.351 0.722
(0) (0.04)
High Loss/Total Assets Ratio 0.056 0.711 0.655 0.248 1.335 1.087
(0) (0.08)
Low Loss/Total Assets Ratio 0.071 0.409 0.338 1.621 1.81 0.189
(0.55) (0.69)
Note: High means higher than or equal to median and Low lower than median 
Household lending growth rate Private Corporations lending growth rate
Table 12. The Transmission of Money Market Volatility on Real Economic Activities
Households Private Corporations Households Private Corporations Households Private Corporations
Interbank rate spread to policy rate (t) -0.1 0.781 1.131 1.491** -0.053* 0.027
(0.47) (0.949) (1.180) (0.723) (0.031) (0.049)
Interbank rate spread to policy rate 
(t)*crisis 1.305** 0.615 -0.495 -0.102 0.016 -0.146**
(0.618) (1.246) (1.550) (0.950) (0.04) (0.065)
(Pre crisis Retail deposits/Interbank 
deposits)(i)*crisis(t) 2.861 8.098** 14.199*** 17.392*** -0.140 0.125
(1.862) (3.770) (4.660) (2.875) (0.119) (0.190)
(Sub-Prime losses/Total 
assets)(i)*crisis(t)*1000 9.740*** 5.099 12.462** -6.989** 0.010 0.185
(2.2) (4.456) (5.508) (3.400) (0.141) (0.225)
crisis(t) (a) -14.313 -50.993*** 39.105* -63.726*** 1.139** 0.378
(8.931) (18.052) (22.364) (13.763) (0.574) (0.921)
constant 35.266*** 120.177*** -10.694 166.088*** 0.600 0.437




R-squared 0.84 0.62 0.87 0.79 0.28 0.21
Bank fixed effects x x x x x x
Seasonal Dummies x x x x x x
Nbr. Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (*),(**),(***) stand for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.  
Seasonal dummies include quarter fixed effects; two dummies for the first month and the last month of a quarter; dummies for the months of June, July and August 2007. 
(a) crisis is a post August 8th 2007 dummy variable. 
Rates spread to policy rate Lending volume growth rate %
Floating rate Fixed rate
Rates spread to policy rate
In this table we report estimates of the effect of higher volatility in interbank markets on lending volume to households and non
financial corporations and rates as specified in system (8) and using 3SLS. The growth rate of the stock of loans extended to 
retail borrowers is calculated relative to the previous month; crisis is a dummy variable taking value one from August 2007 
onwards. The model is estimated using three-stage-least squares on monthly data covering the top five banks in the period 
January 2007 to May-June 2008. 
